Imposition of special disabilities- Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572
Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572
When the conservatorship investigator writes his or her report, they report on whether the conservatee should have any legal disabilities imposed. The court report is supposed to be considered a recommendation to the court, not a binding order. The court is supposed to use its discretion and the evidence presented to make a determination on whether legal disabilities should be imposed. The conservatorship of Walker found that the court to have abused its discretion by summarily imposing legal disability on the sole basis that the conservatee was deemed gravely disabled. Other issues at hand are the issue of whether requesting a rehearing on the matter of special disability precludes the conservatee from contesting other matters and using the entire case record for making a determination as to whether conservatee is gravely disabled.
At the time the Walker suffered from delusions of the paranoid type. He believed that he was being poisoned and watched by the FBI. The doctor opined that the conservatee was suffering from hallucinations that were making him aggressive and a danger to self and others. He believed that if the conservatee was not conserved he would not follow his medication regimen, but the conservatee did retain the cognitive awareness of taking care of his basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter. The doctor emphasized that without supervision the conservatee would deteroiorate in his condition and be unable to care for his food, clothing, and or shelter. He did cite that at the present time of evaluation the conservatee did remain gravely disabled because:
he had no insight into his mental illness. He did not believe he was ill, nor did he believe he needed medication. The evidence was undisputed that without the medication, appellant could not provide for himself. Given the opportunity to dispute the statements that he lacked insight into his illness and would not take his medication if released, appellant could offer nothing more than his statement that he had taken the medicine before. Such testimony, however, did not controvert the doctor's opinion that appellant still needed 24-hour supervision. Indeed, the fact that appellant had been gravely disabled and committed in 1986 was evidence which the court could consider that appellant did not take his medication on a voluntary basis.
The conservatee contested stating that even though he had issues in the past with noncompliance, that should not be taken into present matter as he would take any medication.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. Asked whether he would continue taking his medicine if he were no longer a conservatee, appellant replied: "Well, in six years, I lived in a foster home, and I took it every day, and I got it from the VA. And when I was out here to Perdue Street, I took it every day. When I lived in Aberdine, South Dakota, I took it every day."
When asked again by his counsel whether he would take his medication if he were released from the conservatorship, appellant stated: "Yeah, I've been taking it. You can call Dr. Mooney over here at the VA. And I was gonna tell you something else. If you want records of the FBI, you can ask me, you can get them at the VMC."
The court responded that
“review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence – that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value – such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the [respondent is gravely disabled] beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Because of this despite conservatee’s current compliance, taking the historical record and psychiatric opinion into consideration, the court found that appellant was currently gravely disabled and a conservator needed to be appointed.
When establishing a conservatorship, the public conservator can ask for the specific remedies
"3. The following disabilities are imposed on the conservatee:
"a. The conservatee shall not have the privilege of possessing a license to operate a motor vehicle.
"b. The conservatee shall not have the right to enter into any contracts.
"c. The conservatee shall not have the right to refuse treatment related specifically to the conservatee's being gravely disabled.
"d. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 8103(e), the conservatee shall not have the right to possess a firearm or any other deadly weapon."
In the case of Walker the public conservator failed to proffer a single reason for imposing the above disabilities:
respondent also alleged it was in the conservatee's best interests that he be deprived of the privilege of possessing a driver's license, the right to enter into contracts, and the right to possess a firearm or other deadly weapon.
On the matter of whether the conservatee should have had his legal rights suspended, the court found that the trial court had erred in immediately moving to imposing the special disabilities with presenting any substantial evidence that demonstrates that the conservatee should not retain his rights. The conservator contends that because the conservatee waived his right to a hearing, they were not required to furnish evidence that showed the need to impose special disabilities.
The court notes that
"At any time, a conservatee or any person on his behalf with the consent of the conservatee or his counsel, may petition the court for a hearing to contest the rights denied under Section 5357 or the powers granted to the conservator under Section 5358. However, after the filing of the first petition for hearing pursuant to this section, no further petition for rehearing shall be submitted for a period of six months. [206 Cal. App. 3d 1579]
The court reminds that because of the seriousness of the matters, the conservatee continuing to be gravely disabled does not by itself satisfy the evidentiary requirements for the imposition of special disabilities under section 5357. There needs to be a show of cause in order for disabilities to be applied. In addition, the court found that contesting the special disabilities is a separate matter than contesting grave disability and that by setting a hearing, the conservatee does not jeopardize his right to future hearings within the appropriate time frame.
The court sustained the order appointing the public conservator as conservator over the person of Walker but remanded the issue of imposition of special disabilities to a lower court.
Procedural Posture
Appellant sought review of the order of the Superior Court of Fresno County (California), which reappointed respondent public guardian as appellant's conservator pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5361, and continued the imposition of special disabilities pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5357, where appellant contended he was not gravely disabled.
Overview
Appellant was found to be gravely disabled and respondent conservator was appointed conservator pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris Short Act (LPS). Subsequently, the trial court imposed specified disabilities including the loss of the privilege to drive a car, enter contracts, and possess a firearm. Approximately one year later, respondent's petition for reappointment and for continuation of the disabilities was granted. On review, the court affirmed the reappointment and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the continuation of disabilities. The court found that respondent's reappointment was proper because the trial court's decision was supported by substantial evidence that appellant remained gravely disabled. However, the court ruled that the evidentiary basis to support the continuation of the disabilities was unclear. The court noted that respondent had the burden of producing evidence to support the continuation and that the fact that appellant continued to be gravely disabled did not by itself satisfy the evidentiary requirements. The court ruled that appellant did not forfeit any legal right nor suffer legal disability by reason of his LPS commitment alone.
Outcome
The court affirmed the reappointment of respondent conservator but remanded for further proceedings the issue concerning the continuation of appellant's disabilities. The court found that respondent's reappointment was supported by substantial evidence in that appellant remained gravely disabled. However, the court noted that respondent failed to meet the burden of producing evidence to support the continuation of disabilities.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court reappointment of the conservatorship but remanded the matter for further proceedings concerning special disabilities. The appellate court held that “the fact that appellant continued to be gravely disabled did not by itself satisfy the evidentiary requirements for the imposition of special disabilities under section 5357. A conservatee does not forfeit any legal right nor suffer legal disability by reason of the LPS commitment alone.” (Id. at 1578.) The court also ruled that the petitioner in a conservatorship reestablishment proceeding has the burden of producing evidence to support the special disabilities which he sought. (Id.) And, the court held that nothing in W&I Code § 5358.3 prevents a conservatee from seeking appellate review (i.e., a conservatee need not exhaust remedies by filing a petition challenging powers of conservator or disabilities imposed on conservatee pursuant to 5358.3 before seeking appellate review on issue). (Id. at 1578 1579.)
Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572
When the conservatorship investigator writes his or her report, they report on whether the conservatee should have any legal disabilities imposed. The court report is supposed to be considered a recommendation to the court, not a binding order. The court is supposed to use its discretion and the evidence presented to make a determination on whether legal disabilities should be imposed. The conservatorship of Walker found that the court to have abused its discretion by summarily imposing legal disability on the sole basis that the conservatee was deemed gravely disabled. Other issues at hand are the issue of whether requesting a rehearing on the matter of special disability precludes the conservatee from contesting other matters and using the entire case record for making a determination as to whether conservatee is gravely disabled.
At the time the Walker suffered from delusions of the paranoid type. He believed that he was being poisoned and watched by the FBI. The doctor opined that the conservatee was suffering from hallucinations that were making him aggressive and a danger to self and others. He believed that if the conservatee was not conserved he would not follow his medication regimen, but the conservatee did retain the cognitive awareness of taking care of his basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter. The doctor emphasized that without supervision the conservatee would deteroiorate in his condition and be unable to care for his food, clothing, and or shelter. He did cite that at the present time of evaluation the conservatee did remain gravely disabled because:
he had no insight into his mental illness. He did not believe he was ill, nor did he believe he needed medication. The evidence was undisputed that without the medication, appellant could not provide for himself. Given the opportunity to dispute the statements that he lacked insight into his illness and would not take his medication if released, appellant could offer nothing more than his statement that he had taken the medicine before. Such testimony, however, did not controvert the doctor's opinion that appellant still needed 24-hour supervision. Indeed, the fact that appellant had been gravely disabled and committed in 1986 was evidence which the court could consider that appellant did not take his medication on a voluntary basis.
The conservatee contested stating that even though he had issues in the past with noncompliance, that should not be taken into present matter as he would take any medication.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. Asked whether he would continue taking his medicine if he were no longer a conservatee, appellant replied: "Well, in six years, I lived in a foster home, and I took it every day, and I got it from the VA. And when I was out here to Perdue Street, I took it every day. When I lived in Aberdine, South Dakota, I took it every day."
When asked again by his counsel whether he would take his medication if he were released from the conservatorship, appellant stated: "Yeah, I've been taking it. You can call Dr. Mooney over here at the VA. And I was gonna tell you something else. If you want records of the FBI, you can ask me, you can get them at the VMC."
The court responded that
“review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence – that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value – such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the [respondent is gravely disabled] beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Because of this despite conservatee’s current compliance, taking the historical record and psychiatric opinion into consideration, the court found that appellant was currently gravely disabled and a conservator needed to be appointed.
When establishing a conservatorship, the public conservator can ask for the specific remedies
"3. The following disabilities are imposed on the conservatee:
"a. The conservatee shall not have the privilege of possessing a license to operate a motor vehicle.
"b. The conservatee shall not have the right to enter into any contracts.
"c. The conservatee shall not have the right to refuse treatment related specifically to the conservatee's being gravely disabled.
"d. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 8103(e), the conservatee shall not have the right to possess a firearm or any other deadly weapon."
In the case of Walker the public conservator failed to proffer a single reason for imposing the above disabilities:
respondent also alleged it was in the conservatee's best interests that he be deprived of the privilege of possessing a driver's license, the right to enter into contracts, and the right to possess a firearm or other deadly weapon.
On the matter of whether the conservatee should have had his legal rights suspended, the court found that the trial court had erred in immediately moving to imposing the special disabilities with presenting any substantial evidence that demonstrates that the conservatee should not retain his rights. The conservator contends that because the conservatee waived his right to a hearing, they were not required to furnish evidence that showed the need to impose special disabilities.
The court notes that
"At any time, a conservatee or any person on his behalf with the consent of the conservatee or his counsel, may petition the court for a hearing to contest the rights denied under Section 5357 or the powers granted to the conservator under Section 5358. However, after the filing of the first petition for hearing pursuant to this section, no further petition for rehearing shall be submitted for a period of six months. [206 Cal. App. 3d 1579]
The court reminds that because of the seriousness of the matters, the conservatee continuing to be gravely disabled does not by itself satisfy the evidentiary requirements for the imposition of special disabilities under section 5357. There needs to be a show of cause in order for disabilities to be applied. In addition, the court found that contesting the special disabilities is a separate matter than contesting grave disability and that by setting a hearing, the conservatee does not jeopardize his right to future hearings within the appropriate time frame.
The court sustained the order appointing the public conservator as conservator over the person of Walker but remanded the issue of imposition of special disabilities to a lower court.
Procedural Posture
Appellant sought review of the order of the Superior Court of Fresno County (California), which reappointed respondent public guardian as appellant's conservator pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5361, and continued the imposition of special disabilities pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5357, where appellant contended he was not gravely disabled.
Overview
Appellant was found to be gravely disabled and respondent conservator was appointed conservator pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris Short Act (LPS). Subsequently, the trial court imposed specified disabilities including the loss of the privilege to drive a car, enter contracts, and possess a firearm. Approximately one year later, respondent's petition for reappointment and for continuation of the disabilities was granted. On review, the court affirmed the reappointment and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the continuation of disabilities. The court found that respondent's reappointment was proper because the trial court's decision was supported by substantial evidence that appellant remained gravely disabled. However, the court ruled that the evidentiary basis to support the continuation of the disabilities was unclear. The court noted that respondent had the burden of producing evidence to support the continuation and that the fact that appellant continued to be gravely disabled did not by itself satisfy the evidentiary requirements. The court ruled that appellant did not forfeit any legal right nor suffer legal disability by reason of his LPS commitment alone.
Outcome
The court affirmed the reappointment of respondent conservator but remanded for further proceedings the issue concerning the continuation of appellant's disabilities. The court found that respondent's reappointment was supported by substantial evidence in that appellant remained gravely disabled. However, the court noted that respondent failed to meet the burden of producing evidence to support the continuation of disabilities.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court reappointment of the conservatorship but remanded the matter for further proceedings concerning special disabilities. The appellate court held that “the fact that appellant continued to be gravely disabled did not by itself satisfy the evidentiary requirements for the imposition of special disabilities under section 5357. A conservatee does not forfeit any legal right nor suffer legal disability by reason of the LPS commitment alone.” (Id. at 1578.) The court also ruled that the petitioner in a conservatorship reestablishment proceeding has the burden of producing evidence to support the special disabilities which he sought. (Id.) And, the court held that nothing in W&I Code § 5358.3 prevents a conservatee from seeking appellate review (i.e., a conservatee need not exhaust remedies by filing a petition challenging powers of conservator or disabilities imposed on conservatee pursuant to 5358.3 before seeking appellate review on issue). (Id. at 1578 1579.)