Conservatorship of Torres/ Admissibility of Psychiatrist report
Conservatorship of Torres, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1159
Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One
April 29, 1986 No. D002430
180 Cal. App. 3d 1159 * | 226 Cal. Rptr. 142 ** |
Conservatee appeals on the basis that the trial court had erred by admitting the psychiatrist's testimony citing that the court had allowed inadmissible hearsay. Upon review the appellate court found that the trial court did not make an error and affirmed the judgement. Discussion below
The Conservatorship of the Person of Noe Torres v SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES.
Conservatee was being detained at a mental health facility in San Diego.. He was facing a hearing that sought to reestablish public conservator as LPS conservator over his person. His treating psychiatrist sought the conservatorship citing that Torres suffered from schizophrenia and intermittent explosive disorder. Because of Torres's mental disorders he was unable to provide for his food, clothing, and shelter. While in care, Torres would demonstrate violent behaviour and on several incidents cause serious injury to staff. The instant court adjudged Torres gravely disabled and appointed Public conservator as conservator over his person. Torres was remanded to the custody of Patton state hospital. Conservatee filed a timely appeal. The court examines each of conservatee's contentions.
The conservatee contends that the court made prejudicial error by admitting the psychiatrist's expert testimony. He challenges on the following basis.
Torre's challenge to this evidence is based on an amalgam of the following: the psychiatrist's use of hearsay evidence permitted otherwise inadmissible evidence to be received and expertise was unnecessary on the issue of his inability to take care of himself; he also says portions of the psychiatrist's testimony became unnecessary, thus prejudicial, denying him a fair trial because he admitted he suffered from a mental disorder. Torres admits here that Browning's testimony is substantial evidence to support the finding that he is unable to take care of his basic needs. None of these arguments has merit.
The appellate court found that none of these contentions hold merit.
In order to prove that the conservatee suffers from a mental disorder, the court must demonstrate that the conservatee has a mental disorder and that the symptoms interfere with their ability to care for their food, clothing, and shelter.
The issue presented to the jury was whether Torres was gravely disabled under the applicable provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 5008, subdivision (h)(1), provides that gravely disabled is "[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his basic personal needs of food, clothing, or shelter ...."
Thus in order to establish a conservatorship the proponent must first prove the proposed conservatee has a mental disorder and that the disorder prevents the proposed conservatee from providing for his or her basic personal needs. The trial court in his opening told the jury counsel did not dispute conservatee's mental disorder but did not clarify on the issue of whether the relationship between the disorder and the conservatee's ability to provide for his needs was significant.
Had there been such a stipulation a jury trial on this issue would have been unnecessary. The court would have merely directed a [180 Cal. App. 3d 1163] verdict based on counsel's stipulation.
Because of the court failed to bring to light the testimony that his mental disorder impacted his inability to provide for his basic needs. The psychiatrist's testimony was relevant on the disputed issue of the relationship between Torres' mental disorder and his ability to take care of himself.
As a reminder per Evid. Code, §702, subd. (a).), a psychiatrist who can testify as an expert witness can testify on subjects sufficiently beyond common experience in order to assist the jury in making their factual findings. In regards to whether said expert witness may testify on a person's mental capacity, the code stipulates that the psychiatrist may testify and rely on hearsay. The court reasons that because a lay person may be able to assess whether or not a LPS conservatee can take care of their basic needs. they cannot make a judgement about the origin of the conservatee's failure to do so. A lay person lacks the specialized training and expertise gained through a psychiatrist's education and experience.
The court continues to add that this case differs from Conservatorship of Early as that trial court found
barred evidence from third persons as to the proposed conservatee's ability to take care of himself. The fact that third persons may eliminate the need for a conservatorship is unrelated to the evidentiary ruling here. Berlin's testimony did not preclude Torres from presenting testimony by third persons that they were willing to assist him in providing for his basic needs.
This case deals with evidentiary issues not the kind of evidence presented.
It is also unlike conservatorship of Manton which deals with the admissibility of the conservatorship investigator's report. In Manton, the court ruled that parts of the investigator's report may be considered inadmissible for a contested hearing or jury trial.
This case deals with the issue of whether the psychiatrist is allowed to rely on hearsay statement. The court ruled that because this case does not follow the same line of reasoning as the other two, the trial court did not err in upholding the previous judgement. The trial court affirmed the order establishing public conservator as conservator over the person of Torres.
I would like to add a commentary on this case that this case as patients often ask about how the psychiatrist can make such statements about them when there is no proof. Patients will often say that the psychiatrist said that they were acting this way or that the psychiatrist made an incorrect assumption about their case. However, clients must be told that even if the psychiatrist may be stretching the truth, the court usually views the expert witness's opinion favorably as they are an expert who has years of experience.
Case Summary
Procedural Posture
Appellant conservatee challenged an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which reestablished hisconservatorship after a jury found appellant was gravely disabled within the meaning of Cal. Welf. § Inst. Code § 5350(d).
Overview
Respondent public conservator filed a petition seeking to reestablish a conservatorship for appellant conservatee. The jury found that appellant was gravely disabled under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5350(d), and the trial court reappointed respondent as appellant's conservator. Appellant argued that the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting the psychiatrist's opinion testimony, because the psychiatrist had used hearsay evidence in reaching his opinions, and that allowing this testimony permitted otherwise inadmissible evidence to be received. The court held that the psychiatrist was permitted to testify on a person's mental capacities and could rely on hearsay. The court further noted that appellant admitted on appeal that the psychiatrist's testimony was substantial evidence to support the finding that appellant was unable to take care of his basic needs. The court thus held that based on appellant having conceded the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the conservatorship, there was no merit to his contention that the psychiatrist's testimony denied him a fair trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Outcome
The judgment of the trial court reestablishing appellant conservatee's conservatorship was affirmed. Appellant's contention that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of a psychiatrist's testimony was without merit because appellant had conceded the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the conservatorship.
Conservatorship of Torres, 180 Cal. App. 3d 1159
Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One
April 29, 1986 No. D002430
180 Cal. App. 3d 1159 * | 226 Cal. Rptr. 142 ** |
Conservatee appeals on the basis that the trial court had erred by admitting the psychiatrist's testimony citing that the court had allowed inadmissible hearsay. Upon review the appellate court found that the trial court did not make an error and affirmed the judgement. Discussion below
The Conservatorship of the Person of Noe Torres v SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES.
Conservatee was being detained at a mental health facility in San Diego.. He was facing a hearing that sought to reestablish public conservator as LPS conservator over his person. His treating psychiatrist sought the conservatorship citing that Torres suffered from schizophrenia and intermittent explosive disorder. Because of Torres's mental disorders he was unable to provide for his food, clothing, and shelter. While in care, Torres would demonstrate violent behaviour and on several incidents cause serious injury to staff. The instant court adjudged Torres gravely disabled and appointed Public conservator as conservator over his person. Torres was remanded to the custody of Patton state hospital. Conservatee filed a timely appeal. The court examines each of conservatee's contentions.
The conservatee contends that the court made prejudicial error by admitting the psychiatrist's expert testimony. He challenges on the following basis.
Torre's challenge to this evidence is based on an amalgam of the following: the psychiatrist's use of hearsay evidence permitted otherwise inadmissible evidence to be received and expertise was unnecessary on the issue of his inability to take care of himself; he also says portions of the psychiatrist's testimony became unnecessary, thus prejudicial, denying him a fair trial because he admitted he suffered from a mental disorder. Torres admits here that Browning's testimony is substantial evidence to support the finding that he is unable to take care of his basic needs. None of these arguments has merit.
The appellate court found that none of these contentions hold merit.
In order to prove that the conservatee suffers from a mental disorder, the court must demonstrate that the conservatee has a mental disorder and that the symptoms interfere with their ability to care for their food, clothing, and shelter.
The issue presented to the jury was whether Torres was gravely disabled under the applicable provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 5008, subdivision (h)(1), provides that gravely disabled is "[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his basic personal needs of food, clothing, or shelter ...."
Thus in order to establish a conservatorship the proponent must first prove the proposed conservatee has a mental disorder and that the disorder prevents the proposed conservatee from providing for his or her basic personal needs. The trial court in his opening told the jury counsel did not dispute conservatee's mental disorder but did not clarify on the issue of whether the relationship between the disorder and the conservatee's ability to provide for his needs was significant.
Had there been such a stipulation a jury trial on this issue would have been unnecessary. The court would have merely directed a [180 Cal. App. 3d 1163] verdict based on counsel's stipulation.
Because of the court failed to bring to light the testimony that his mental disorder impacted his inability to provide for his basic needs. The psychiatrist's testimony was relevant on the disputed issue of the relationship between Torres' mental disorder and his ability to take care of himself.
As a reminder per Evid. Code, §702, subd. (a).), a psychiatrist who can testify as an expert witness can testify on subjects sufficiently beyond common experience in order to assist the jury in making their factual findings. In regards to whether said expert witness may testify on a person's mental capacity, the code stipulates that the psychiatrist may testify and rely on hearsay. The court reasons that because a lay person may be able to assess whether or not a LPS conservatee can take care of their basic needs. they cannot make a judgement about the origin of the conservatee's failure to do so. A lay person lacks the specialized training and expertise gained through a psychiatrist's education and experience.
The court continues to add that this case differs from Conservatorship of Early as that trial court found
barred evidence from third persons as to the proposed conservatee's ability to take care of himself. The fact that third persons may eliminate the need for a conservatorship is unrelated to the evidentiary ruling here. Berlin's testimony did not preclude Torres from presenting testimony by third persons that they were willing to assist him in providing for his basic needs.
This case deals with evidentiary issues not the kind of evidence presented.
It is also unlike conservatorship of Manton which deals with the admissibility of the conservatorship investigator's report. In Manton, the court ruled that parts of the investigator's report may be considered inadmissible for a contested hearing or jury trial.
This case deals with the issue of whether the psychiatrist is allowed to rely on hearsay statement. The court ruled that because this case does not follow the same line of reasoning as the other two, the trial court did not err in upholding the previous judgement. The trial court affirmed the order establishing public conservator as conservator over the person of Torres.
I would like to add a commentary on this case that this case as patients often ask about how the psychiatrist can make such statements about them when there is no proof. Patients will often say that the psychiatrist said that they were acting this way or that the psychiatrist made an incorrect assumption about their case. However, clients must be told that even if the psychiatrist may be stretching the truth, the court usually views the expert witness's opinion favorably as they are an expert who has years of experience.
Case Summary
Procedural Posture
Appellant conservatee challenged an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which reestablished hisconservatorship after a jury found appellant was gravely disabled within the meaning of Cal. Welf. § Inst. Code § 5350(d).
Overview
Respondent public conservator filed a petition seeking to reestablish a conservatorship for appellant conservatee. The jury found that appellant was gravely disabled under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5350(d), and the trial court reappointed respondent as appellant's conservator. Appellant argued that the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting the psychiatrist's opinion testimony, because the psychiatrist had used hearsay evidence in reaching his opinions, and that allowing this testimony permitted otherwise inadmissible evidence to be received. The court held that the psychiatrist was permitted to testify on a person's mental capacities and could rely on hearsay. The court further noted that appellant admitted on appeal that the psychiatrist's testimony was substantial evidence to support the finding that appellant was unable to take care of his basic needs. The court thus held that based on appellant having conceded the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the conservatorship, there was no merit to his contention that the psychiatrist's testimony denied him a fair trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Outcome
The judgment of the trial court reestablishing appellant conservatee's conservatorship was affirmed. Appellant's contention that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of a psychiatrist's testimony was without merit because appellant had conceded the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the conservatorship.