Erratic behaviour and Conservatorship of Smith (1987)
No. A033206. Court of Appeals of California,
First Appellate District, Division Five. December 8, 1986
The court finds that a propsed conservatee's erratic behaviour should not be a determinant for establishing grave disability alone. The court reminds us once more that grave disability and establishment of an LPS conservator is a deprivation of civil liberties and should be treated with a level of seriousness and restraint. Public conservatorship investigators should not immediately recommend conservatorship at the first sign of mental illness or strange behaviour.
At the time the proposed conservatee was detained awaiting a judgement that would render him gravely disabled and be appointed a conservator. The conservatee contested on several basises. The conservatee contends that the court had misapplied the law in the following ways:
(1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that appellant was "gravely disabled"; (2) the statute (§ 5350 et seq.) was not intended to be used to establish conservatorships for nondangerous mentally ill persons; and (3) government regulation of religious expression is improper where that activity does not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.
At the time appellant had been loitering around a church where appellant had entered the premises and disrupted the services. On occasion appellant would be arrested by law enforcement.
While detained at the local psychiatric hospital her attending psychiatrist evaluated her and determined that she met the criteria for gravely disabled. The doctor opined that due to her erratic behaviour stemming from her mental disorder, she was gravely disabled and unable to function in the community. Despite her erratic behaviour, he did believe that she was able to care for her needs and did not suffer any cognitive deficits. Appellant believed that she was the only one who could interpret the Bible and her actions stemmed from a belief that she must suffer. Upon appointment of conservator appellant filed a timely appeal.
Legal discussion
The clear import of the LPS Act is to use the involuntary commitment power of the state sparingly and only for those truly necessary cases where a "gravely disabled" person is incapable of providing for his basic needs either alone or with help from others. (See Conservatorship of Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 253; Report at pp. 137-138.)
The legislature and case law that follows clearly stipulates that the LPS intends for conservatees to be treated as liberally as possible and that any deprivation in civil liberties should be in extreme cases. Cases where the conservatee cannot by any means take care of themselves including with third party assistance. In this case petitioner stated that he believed the conservatee suffered to such a degree that she could not care of her own needs in any form. The court challenges the statement;
[1b] We conclude that in order to establish that a person is "gravely disabled," the evidence adduced must support an objective finding that the person, due to mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or otherwise provide for her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter.
In this case the petitioner failed to take into consideration that the conservatee did spend time with a relative when not at the Church. The conservatee was indeed able to care for her own needs and did not suffer any cognitive deficits that rendered her unable to address her basic needs.
The court moves to the most pressing matter. In re O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563 [45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 95 S. Ct. 2486], the court finds that a person’s civil liberties cannot be imposed on summarily. In this case the state believed that detainment at a State hospital facility would provide the defendant a better living quality than in the private community.
"[I]ncarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising [their]living standards." (At p. 575 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 407].) [3]
The court upheld that the state cannot detain an nondangerous individual who can care for their own needs safely. In order to commit someone there would need to be a show of proof that would demonstrate that other factor’s prevented the person from caring for their needs. Pertaining to this case, the court also found that the conservatee’s erratic behaviour and communal animosity was not reason for detaining in a state facility. The court applies the same measures to erratic behaviour so long it is not dangerous to other persons or themselves.
Bizarre or eccentric behavior, even if it interferes with a person's normal intercourse with society, does not rise to a level warranting conservatorship except where such behavior renders the individual helpless to fend for herself or destroys her ability to meet those basic needs for survival. Only then does the interest of the state override her individual liberty interests.
The next point the court addresses is a point commonly addressed during these hearing; the standard of proof required for LPS proceedings. The court reminds all that in order to initiate an LPS conservatorship, the conservatee must demonstrate that they are unable to take care of their food, clothing, or shelter. The burden of proof lies at proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the same applied to criminal proceedings. Because of the seriousness of the deprivation of rights, the court needs to apply such a high standard.
The court turns to the records and the evidence adduced. The appellate court acknowledges the fact that appellants behaviour was erratic and strange in which she was compelled to perform such vigils, but her behaviour was never a danger to other or hindered her ability to address her ADLs. The court reminds that even the psychiatrist testified that she was able to care for her own needs and at times does accept shelter. The court also adds that her erratic behaviour had very little to no detrimental effects on her health.
No evidence was adduced to show… was suffering from malnutrition, overexposure, or any other sign of poor health or neglect. Her refusal to seek shelter is not life threatening. There was uncontradicted evidence that she accepts offers of food and money from friends and relatives. Appellant evinces a strong, sincere--if unorthodox --belief in God, her religion and her place in religion. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellant is not "gravely disabled" to justify appointment of a conservator. fn. 5
The court concludes that petitioner had failed to sustain his claim with proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was indeed gravely disabled. The appellate court reversed the order appointing public conservator as conservator over the person of Smith.
Procedural Posture
Appellant proposed conservatee sought review of an order from the Superior Court of Humboldt County (California), which found appellant to be "gravely disabled" under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5008(h) and 5350 and appointed respondent public guardian as conservator for appellant for one year.
Overview
Respondent public guardian requested appellant proposed conservatee be declared "gravely disabled" under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5350 and to appoint respondent conservator. The trial court granted respondent's request for a period not to exceed one year. Respondent confined appellant to a facility for treatment. Appellant challenged the trial court's judgment and order of conservatorship. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment and order of conservatorship ruling that the evidence was insufficient to support a gravely disabled finding. The court held that a person suffering from a mental disorder was not "gravely disabled" under § 5350 if they were capable of carrying out the transactions necessary for survival, including providing for food, clothing or shelter, with or without the aid of others.
Outcome
The court reversed the order of conservatorship ruling that appellant proposed conservatee suffered from a mental disorder, because appellant was not "gravely disabled" when appellant was capable of providing her basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter.
No. A033206. Court of Appeals of California,
First Appellate District, Division Five. December 8, 1986
The court finds that a propsed conservatee's erratic behaviour should not be a determinant for establishing grave disability alone. The court reminds us once more that grave disability and establishment of an LPS conservator is a deprivation of civil liberties and should be treated with a level of seriousness and restraint. Public conservatorship investigators should not immediately recommend conservatorship at the first sign of mental illness or strange behaviour.
At the time the proposed conservatee was detained awaiting a judgement that would render him gravely disabled and be appointed a conservator. The conservatee contested on several basises. The conservatee contends that the court had misapplied the law in the following ways:
(1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that appellant was "gravely disabled"; (2) the statute (§ 5350 et seq.) was not intended to be used to establish conservatorships for nondangerous mentally ill persons; and (3) government regulation of religious expression is improper where that activity does not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.
At the time appellant had been loitering around a church where appellant had entered the premises and disrupted the services. On occasion appellant would be arrested by law enforcement.
While detained at the local psychiatric hospital her attending psychiatrist evaluated her and determined that she met the criteria for gravely disabled. The doctor opined that due to her erratic behaviour stemming from her mental disorder, she was gravely disabled and unable to function in the community. Despite her erratic behaviour, he did believe that she was able to care for her needs and did not suffer any cognitive deficits. Appellant believed that she was the only one who could interpret the Bible and her actions stemmed from a belief that she must suffer. Upon appointment of conservator appellant filed a timely appeal.
Legal discussion
The clear import of the LPS Act is to use the involuntary commitment power of the state sparingly and only for those truly necessary cases where a "gravely disabled" person is incapable of providing for his basic needs either alone or with help from others. (See Conservatorship of Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 253; Report at pp. 137-138.)
The legislature and case law that follows clearly stipulates that the LPS intends for conservatees to be treated as liberally as possible and that any deprivation in civil liberties should be in extreme cases. Cases where the conservatee cannot by any means take care of themselves including with third party assistance. In this case petitioner stated that he believed the conservatee suffered to such a degree that she could not care of her own needs in any form. The court challenges the statement;
[1b] We conclude that in order to establish that a person is "gravely disabled," the evidence adduced must support an objective finding that the person, due to mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or otherwise provide for her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter.
In this case the petitioner failed to take into consideration that the conservatee did spend time with a relative when not at the Church. The conservatee was indeed able to care for her own needs and did not suffer any cognitive deficits that rendered her unable to address her basic needs.
The court moves to the most pressing matter. In re O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563 [45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 95 S. Ct. 2486], the court finds that a person’s civil liberties cannot be imposed on summarily. In this case the state believed that detainment at a State hospital facility would provide the defendant a better living quality than in the private community.
"[I]ncarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising [their]living standards." (At p. 575 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 407].) [3]
The court upheld that the state cannot detain an nondangerous individual who can care for their own needs safely. In order to commit someone there would need to be a show of proof that would demonstrate that other factor’s prevented the person from caring for their needs. Pertaining to this case, the court also found that the conservatee’s erratic behaviour and communal animosity was not reason for detaining in a state facility. The court applies the same measures to erratic behaviour so long it is not dangerous to other persons or themselves.
Bizarre or eccentric behavior, even if it interferes with a person's normal intercourse with society, does not rise to a level warranting conservatorship except where such behavior renders the individual helpless to fend for herself or destroys her ability to meet those basic needs for survival. Only then does the interest of the state override her individual liberty interests.
The next point the court addresses is a point commonly addressed during these hearing; the standard of proof required for LPS proceedings. The court reminds all that in order to initiate an LPS conservatorship, the conservatee must demonstrate that they are unable to take care of their food, clothing, or shelter. The burden of proof lies at proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the same applied to criminal proceedings. Because of the seriousness of the deprivation of rights, the court needs to apply such a high standard.
The court turns to the records and the evidence adduced. The appellate court acknowledges the fact that appellants behaviour was erratic and strange in which she was compelled to perform such vigils, but her behaviour was never a danger to other or hindered her ability to address her ADLs. The court reminds that even the psychiatrist testified that she was able to care for her own needs and at times does accept shelter. The court also adds that her erratic behaviour had very little to no detrimental effects on her health.
No evidence was adduced to show… was suffering from malnutrition, overexposure, or any other sign of poor health or neglect. Her refusal to seek shelter is not life threatening. There was uncontradicted evidence that she accepts offers of food and money from friends and relatives. Appellant evinces a strong, sincere--if unorthodox --belief in God, her religion and her place in religion. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellant is not "gravely disabled" to justify appointment of a conservator. fn. 5
The court concludes that petitioner had failed to sustain his claim with proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was indeed gravely disabled. The appellate court reversed the order appointing public conservator as conservator over the person of Smith.
Procedural Posture
Appellant proposed conservatee sought review of an order from the Superior Court of Humboldt County (California), which found appellant to be "gravely disabled" under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5008(h) and 5350 and appointed respondent public guardian as conservator for appellant for one year.
Overview
Respondent public guardian requested appellant proposed conservatee be declared "gravely disabled" under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5350 and to appoint respondent conservator. The trial court granted respondent's request for a period not to exceed one year. Respondent confined appellant to a facility for treatment. Appellant challenged the trial court's judgment and order of conservatorship. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment and order of conservatorship ruling that the evidence was insufficient to support a gravely disabled finding. The court held that a person suffering from a mental disorder was not "gravely disabled" under § 5350 if they were capable of carrying out the transactions necessary for survival, including providing for food, clothing or shelter, with or without the aid of others.
Outcome
The court reversed the order of conservatorship ruling that appellant proposed conservatee suffered from a mental disorder, because appellant was not "gravely disabled" when appellant was capable of providing her basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter.