Burden of Proof for LPS Conservatorship/ Conservatorship of Roulet
Conservatorship of Roulet , 23 Cal.3d 219
Supreme Court of California
Feb 6, 1979 23 Cal. 3d 219 (Cal. 1979) 23 Cal. 3d 219590 P.2d 1152 Cal. Rptr. 425
This case sets the foundation for the legal burden of proof that the county must use when establishing an LPS conservatorship. Due to the sensitive nature of LPS conservatorship proceedings and the civil liberties that will be taken away the court established that the burden of proof must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the same level as that of a criminal proceeding. In probate and limited conservatorships the court normally finds that the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. because fewer civil liberties are taken away and they are less restrictive. Some may argue that LPS conservatorships should have a lower burden of proof being that LPS is only for a year but we disagree.
Proposed conservatee Roulet was confined at Camarillo State Hospital and pending a reestablishment hearing. Petitioner conservator was asking for a reestablishment hearing as she was continuing to present as gravely disabled.
Contained within the petition the facts of how conservatee was gravely disabled:
"[s]he is so confused, and disorganized that she is unable to make daily living plans. If she has some funds she will waste [ sic] on cigarettes and drinking." The form indicated that appellant was unwilling to accept treatment voluntarily because ". . . she feels she is not mentally ill."
Even though these alone are not indicators of grave disability and in which future case law will be based upon, the petitioner found these enough to establish grave disability. At its prima facie the facts contained with the petition do not have a
probative value [that] is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
This alone should raise a red flag for the court as to whether the petitioner is meeting his burden of proof for the trier of fact. In addition, if there was more information, it has not been submitted into a formal record so the court should not treat any other facts as if they are a part of the file without making formal motions to enter those facts as part of a formal record.
Roulet asked that a jury trial be set based on Welf and Inst Code § 5350 (d). The conservatee asked the trial judge that the jury be instructed that
a conservator could be appointed for her only if the jury unanimously agreed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was gravely disabled as the result of mental disorder.
The trial judge refused to her request and informed the jury that they only needed to apply the preponderance of evidence standard rather than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that only 9 out of 12 jurors had to agree to establish a verdict. As a result of the judge's instruction appellant was found to be gravely disabled. The court ordered that the public conservator be appointed conservator of her person and that special treatment powers in accordance to Welf and Inst § 5358 and 5357 be established.
Upon the decision appellant filed a timely appeal and the matter heard by appellate court.
In the matter of whether the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be applied and whether a unanimous jury verdict was required the appellate court held dissents below.
In criminal trials, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is an obstacle the state places in its own way, in order to lessen the possibility of convicting an innocent person. In People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 319-322 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352], this court explicitly recognized that civil commitment to a mental hospital, despite its civil label, threatens a person's liberty and dignity on as massive a scale as that traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions
If the same logic were to apply to criminal proceedings then the burden of proof must be the same as so the court does not appear hypocritical in its own logic and reasoning. The court also mentions the "lasting stigma" of civil commitment and that treating civil commitment with such a laissez faire attitude jeopardizes a person's constitutional rights.
In addition, the court notes that the special disability granted by Welf and Inst §§ 5357, 5358 allow for the conservator to place the conservatee in a locked facility for a year or more if a reestablishment petition is granted. Comparing with commitment via the penal code a defendant may only be held for 90 days at a time before a review hearing is mandatory.
In effect, these statutes assure in many cases an unbroken and indefinite period of state-sanctioned confinement.
Even though the law theoretically permits life long commitment to a facility, the law does mandate reviews every year as to preserve a person’s rights and ensure that they are given a chance annually to fight their commitment.
"The theoretical maximum period of detention is life as successive petitions may be filed. . . ." ( In re Gary W.(1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 300 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201], italics added.)
The court contends that arguing over the merits of whether conservatorship is a criminal matter or a civil matter should be moot as
"commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called `criminal' or `civil.'" ( In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 50 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 558, 87 S.Ct. 1428].)
By focusing on the legal aspects of civil commitment the court reminds us that the court should be looking at the consequences of involuntary commitment. Drawing from the impact of the consequences namely the stigma, isolation of closed locked treatment, forced medication, and having the state make decisions for you, the court decides such consequences need the most safeguarding in the form of high burden of proof.
The court makes a small note about how the state hospitals at this time are akin to “sanitary dungeons”.
There are bare corridors, bars, iron gates, rows of cells — all the stigmata of punishment rather than treatment. Because of the harsh reality of the treatment facilities, the courts must impose the highest burden of proof upon the petitioner.
In regards to the unanimous jury vote the appellate court found that due to the severity of the civil liberties lost, the conservatee is entitled to the same rights of those facing a criminal proceeding.
Under the trial judge's ruling, appellant theoretically could have been certified as gravely disabled and committed to a mental hospital, even though 3 of the 12 jurors found her perfectly sane.
Any other result would mock the care our legal system has historically taken to guard against incarcerating the wrong person.
The court takes care to note that even Calif and federal constitutional provision §5303 demand that imminently dangerous persons should be allowed to have unanimous jury vote. The court would require that imminently dangerous persons would need to be legally differentiated before LPS conservatees and imminently dangerous persons be allowed to have differing jury outcomes.
Section 5303 explicitly extends the protection of unanimous jury verdicts to commitment proceedings for imminently dangerous persons. It is a cornerstone of constitutional adjudication that courts interpret statutes, wherever possible, so as to preserve their constitutionality. (See, e.g., Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 305 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53, 562 P.2d 1302].)
The court cites that in accordance to In re Gary W., supra, 5 Cal.3d 296, 306.) the state must make a show of “compelling interest” as to why conservatees and imminently dangerous persons should be treated differently before equal protection under the law be denied. The state only stated that the LPS conservatorship is an act of good faith toward the conservatee and that criminal proceedings for dangerous persons is a matter of public safety. Since the petitioner did not make a proper show, the court denied its request. The court notes that not all good intentions have the intended outcome and therefore the conservatee should be entitled to equal protection.
The court also added that the path to civil commitment is far more accessible than that of a criminal nature. For civil commitment under the LPS act a general show of why the conservatee is gravely disabled is needed whereas for criminal proceeding,
Require[s] the demonstration of a threatened, attempted, or actually inflicted physical harm on another person, as well as an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others by reason of a mental disorder. (§ 5304.)
The last note the trial court addressed was the issue of factual distortions. These distortions are responsible for some of the errors made by the court. Prior to LPS conservatorship establishment most conservatees are placed in a closed locked treatment facility where they are have little access to resources, people, and lawyer who can help them prepare. The conservatee’s behaviour before the trial or bench hearing is heavily relied up on as evidence of their purported grave disability. The conservatee may behave strangely or act more unusual in the days before. This generates a factual distortion that the court may overly rely on thus create large room for error. Their stressful behaviour is not indicative of grave disability and should not be the sole source for the court to rely upon. Even though it is not commended, counsel may treat the conservatee in a condescending way as their personal biases toward mental illness may influence their judgement.
the individual's pretrial behavior during confinement can be and normally is introduced at the grave disability hearing to help justify predictions that the individual is and will continue to be gravely disabled.
In addition, the literature reveals that some appointed counsel, regardless of how experienced they may be, tend to play a paternalistic rather than an advocacy role in commitment proceedings.
Because of these present biases and conflicts, the court cites these are further reasons for raising the burden of proof to beyond a reasonable doubt with a unanimous jury verdict
Based on all of the above, the appellate court reversed the decision appointing the public conservator as conservator over the person of Roulet.
Procedural Posture
Appellant individual sought review of an order from the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County (California), which named respondent county guardian the individual's conservator and designated the individual as gravely disabled under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5350 et seq. The individual contended the proper standard to apply was reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict.
Overview
The individual, who had been adjudicated mentally ill, sought review of the jury verdict finding her to be gravely disabled, under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5350 et seq., and appointing the county guardian her conservator. The individual contended that the trial court erred in not applying the standard of reasonable doubt in making the determination whether she was gravely disabled and in not requiring a unanimous jury verdict. The court reversed and held that the commitment of a person to a mental institution against their will was a deprivation of liberty serious enough to require the highest standard of proof. Further, the court held that the destruction of an individual's personal freedoms effected by civil commitment was scarcely less total than that effected by confinement in a penitentiary. The court also held that it was constitutionally mandated that the choice of standard of proof implicated due process considerations which must be resolved by focusing not on the theoretical nature of the proceedings but rather on the actual consequences of commitment. The court also held that a unanimous jury must approve the commitment.
Outcome
The court reversed the trial court and held that a gravely disabled finding must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury as the deprivation of liberty by a civil commitment was incarceration against one's will.
****Interesting note not directly related to subject matter:
"A report on LPS conservatorships in Santa Clara County revealed that a majority of conservatees had no personal contact with their conservators, and in fact they did not even know their names. [Fn. omitted.]" (Morris, Conservatorship for GravelyDisabled, supra, 15 San Diego L.Rev. 227.)
Conservatorship of Roulet , 23 Cal.3d 219
Supreme Court of California
Feb 6, 1979 23 Cal. 3d 219 (Cal. 1979) 23 Cal. 3d 219590 P.2d 1152 Cal. Rptr. 425
This case sets the foundation for the legal burden of proof that the county must use when establishing an LPS conservatorship. Due to the sensitive nature of LPS conservatorship proceedings and the civil liberties that will be taken away the court established that the burden of proof must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the same level as that of a criminal proceeding. In probate and limited conservatorships the court normally finds that the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. because fewer civil liberties are taken away and they are less restrictive. Some may argue that LPS conservatorships should have a lower burden of proof being that LPS is only for a year but we disagree.
Proposed conservatee Roulet was confined at Camarillo State Hospital and pending a reestablishment hearing. Petitioner conservator was asking for a reestablishment hearing as she was continuing to present as gravely disabled.
Contained within the petition the facts of how conservatee was gravely disabled:
"[s]he is so confused, and disorganized that she is unable to make daily living plans. If she has some funds she will waste [ sic] on cigarettes and drinking." The form indicated that appellant was unwilling to accept treatment voluntarily because ". . . she feels she is not mentally ill."
Even though these alone are not indicators of grave disability and in which future case law will be based upon, the petitioner found these enough to establish grave disability. At its prima facie the facts contained with the petition do not have a
probative value [that] is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
This alone should raise a red flag for the court as to whether the petitioner is meeting his burden of proof for the trier of fact. In addition, if there was more information, it has not been submitted into a formal record so the court should not treat any other facts as if they are a part of the file without making formal motions to enter those facts as part of a formal record.
Roulet asked that a jury trial be set based on Welf and Inst Code § 5350 (d). The conservatee asked the trial judge that the jury be instructed that
a conservator could be appointed for her only if the jury unanimously agreed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was gravely disabled as the result of mental disorder.
The trial judge refused to her request and informed the jury that they only needed to apply the preponderance of evidence standard rather than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that only 9 out of 12 jurors had to agree to establish a verdict. As a result of the judge's instruction appellant was found to be gravely disabled. The court ordered that the public conservator be appointed conservator of her person and that special treatment powers in accordance to Welf and Inst § 5358 and 5357 be established.
Upon the decision appellant filed a timely appeal and the matter heard by appellate court.
In the matter of whether the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be applied and whether a unanimous jury verdict was required the appellate court held dissents below.
In criminal trials, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is an obstacle the state places in its own way, in order to lessen the possibility of convicting an innocent person. In People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 319-322 [ 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352], this court explicitly recognized that civil commitment to a mental hospital, despite its civil label, threatens a person's liberty and dignity on as massive a scale as that traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions
If the same logic were to apply to criminal proceedings then the burden of proof must be the same as so the court does not appear hypocritical in its own logic and reasoning. The court also mentions the "lasting stigma" of civil commitment and that treating civil commitment with such a laissez faire attitude jeopardizes a person's constitutional rights.
In addition, the court notes that the special disability granted by Welf and Inst §§ 5357, 5358 allow for the conservator to place the conservatee in a locked facility for a year or more if a reestablishment petition is granted. Comparing with commitment via the penal code a defendant may only be held for 90 days at a time before a review hearing is mandatory.
In effect, these statutes assure in many cases an unbroken and indefinite period of state-sanctioned confinement.
Even though the law theoretically permits life long commitment to a facility, the law does mandate reviews every year as to preserve a person’s rights and ensure that they are given a chance annually to fight their commitment.
"The theoretical maximum period of detention is life as successive petitions may be filed. . . ." ( In re Gary W.(1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 300 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201], italics added.)
The court contends that arguing over the merits of whether conservatorship is a criminal matter or a civil matter should be moot as
"commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called `criminal' or `civil.'" ( In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 50 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 558, 87 S.Ct. 1428].)
By focusing on the legal aspects of civil commitment the court reminds us that the court should be looking at the consequences of involuntary commitment. Drawing from the impact of the consequences namely the stigma, isolation of closed locked treatment, forced medication, and having the state make decisions for you, the court decides such consequences need the most safeguarding in the form of high burden of proof.
The court makes a small note about how the state hospitals at this time are akin to “sanitary dungeons”.
There are bare corridors, bars, iron gates, rows of cells — all the stigmata of punishment rather than treatment. Because of the harsh reality of the treatment facilities, the courts must impose the highest burden of proof upon the petitioner.
In regards to the unanimous jury vote the appellate court found that due to the severity of the civil liberties lost, the conservatee is entitled to the same rights of those facing a criminal proceeding.
Under the trial judge's ruling, appellant theoretically could have been certified as gravely disabled and committed to a mental hospital, even though 3 of the 12 jurors found her perfectly sane.
Any other result would mock the care our legal system has historically taken to guard against incarcerating the wrong person.
The court takes care to note that even Calif and federal constitutional provision §5303 demand that imminently dangerous persons should be allowed to have unanimous jury vote. The court would require that imminently dangerous persons would need to be legally differentiated before LPS conservatees and imminently dangerous persons be allowed to have differing jury outcomes.
Section 5303 explicitly extends the protection of unanimous jury verdicts to commitment proceedings for imminently dangerous persons. It is a cornerstone of constitutional adjudication that courts interpret statutes, wherever possible, so as to preserve their constitutionality. (See, e.g., Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 305 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 53, 562 P.2d 1302].)
The court cites that in accordance to In re Gary W., supra, 5 Cal.3d 296, 306.) the state must make a show of “compelling interest” as to why conservatees and imminently dangerous persons should be treated differently before equal protection under the law be denied. The state only stated that the LPS conservatorship is an act of good faith toward the conservatee and that criminal proceedings for dangerous persons is a matter of public safety. Since the petitioner did not make a proper show, the court denied its request. The court notes that not all good intentions have the intended outcome and therefore the conservatee should be entitled to equal protection.
The court also added that the path to civil commitment is far more accessible than that of a criminal nature. For civil commitment under the LPS act a general show of why the conservatee is gravely disabled is needed whereas for criminal proceeding,
Require[s] the demonstration of a threatened, attempted, or actually inflicted physical harm on another person, as well as an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others by reason of a mental disorder. (§ 5304.)
The last note the trial court addressed was the issue of factual distortions. These distortions are responsible for some of the errors made by the court. Prior to LPS conservatorship establishment most conservatees are placed in a closed locked treatment facility where they are have little access to resources, people, and lawyer who can help them prepare. The conservatee’s behaviour before the trial or bench hearing is heavily relied up on as evidence of their purported grave disability. The conservatee may behave strangely or act more unusual in the days before. This generates a factual distortion that the court may overly rely on thus create large room for error. Their stressful behaviour is not indicative of grave disability and should not be the sole source for the court to rely upon. Even though it is not commended, counsel may treat the conservatee in a condescending way as their personal biases toward mental illness may influence their judgement.
the individual's pretrial behavior during confinement can be and normally is introduced at the grave disability hearing to help justify predictions that the individual is and will continue to be gravely disabled.
In addition, the literature reveals that some appointed counsel, regardless of how experienced they may be, tend to play a paternalistic rather than an advocacy role in commitment proceedings.
Because of these present biases and conflicts, the court cites these are further reasons for raising the burden of proof to beyond a reasonable doubt with a unanimous jury verdict
Based on all of the above, the appellate court reversed the decision appointing the public conservator as conservator over the person of Roulet.
Procedural Posture
Appellant individual sought review of an order from the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County (California), which named respondent county guardian the individual's conservator and designated the individual as gravely disabled under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5350 et seq. The individual contended the proper standard to apply was reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict.
Overview
The individual, who had been adjudicated mentally ill, sought review of the jury verdict finding her to be gravely disabled, under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5350 et seq., and appointing the county guardian her conservator. The individual contended that the trial court erred in not applying the standard of reasonable doubt in making the determination whether she was gravely disabled and in not requiring a unanimous jury verdict. The court reversed and held that the commitment of a person to a mental institution against their will was a deprivation of liberty serious enough to require the highest standard of proof. Further, the court held that the destruction of an individual's personal freedoms effected by civil commitment was scarcely less total than that effected by confinement in a penitentiary. The court also held that it was constitutionally mandated that the choice of standard of proof implicated due process considerations which must be resolved by focusing not on the theoretical nature of the proceedings but rather on the actual consequences of commitment. The court also held that a unanimous jury must approve the commitment.
Outcome
The court reversed the trial court and held that a gravely disabled finding must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury as the deprivation of liberty by a civil commitment was incarceration against one's will.
****Interesting note not directly related to subject matter:
"A report on LPS conservatorships in Santa Clara County revealed that a majority of conservatees had no personal contact with their conservators, and in fact they did not even know their names. [Fn. omitted.]" (Morris, Conservatorship for GravelyDisabled, supra, 15 San Diego L.Rev. 227.)