Jury Instruction and Conservatorship of Law (1988)
Conservatorship of Law, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1336
The conservatee appeals a judgement order that be she be conserved by the San Diego public conservator. She contends that the trial court had inappropriately instructed the jury in regards to presuming grave disability. The appellate court found that the trial court did not err in establishing the ccnservatorship..
The conservatee at the time of her initial hearing was in the care of the residential care facility in Lemon grove. She was suffering from delusions and psychosis.. At the time her treating psychiatrist testified:
when Law refused to take her medication she exhibited bizarre behavior, inappropriate emotional reactions and expressed ideas of persecution and became suspicious of others. She became hostile and could not distinguish reality from her thoughts. On several occasions these combined symptoms led to her hospitalization. [202 Cal. App. 3d 1339]
The conservatee was being treated with IM injections of haldol Deconate. He prescribed the following because he found her mental illness to be so severe that she could not function without sustained medication. Furthermore he testified that she was unable to survive for long without necessitating hospitalization and intensive care. Testimony was also submitted stating that the conservatee was unable to remain compliant with her medication and that when off of her medication, she was unable to function and suffered from delusions of persecution. Her mother stated that the conservatee at the time was not able to live with her. The conservatee testified and opined that she did not suffer from a mental disorder. She believed that if released from conservatorship she would remain compliant on medication and plan to live at the residential treatment facility. Her social worker testified during the proceedings and stated that she had seen the conservatee well dressed and presentable.
The conservatee appeals the order. She asserts that there were several fundamental errors in instructing the jury. The appellate court reviews each contention and finds no error.
First the conservatee contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury as to the reasonable standard of proof required for a finding of grave disability. The court informed the jury that the standard of proof was the same as a criminal case and that the county had the burden of proof. In re Cons of Walker:
Conservatorship of Walker (1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 1099 [242 Cal. Rptr. 289], "[t]he trial court may properly refuse the additional instructions if they are repetitive and merely restate legal principles in another manner. [Citation.]" There was no error in the instruction as given and in refusing the additional instruction requested by Law.
The court found there was no error in the court's part in instructing the jury. The court found that omitting some instructions was acceptable as it may reduce redundancy.
The conservatee also contends that the court erred in not instructing the jury that she be presumed to be gravely disabled until other wise proven. The court affirms her assertion but does state that that error was a harmless error and no prejudice resulted from a lack of instruction. The court states that that assertion exists to insure that
"[t]he only effect of the presumption is to insure that the state proves its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury here was fully instructed as to the effect of the presumption and could not have been prejudiced by the failure to denominate the presumption." (196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1099.)
The next point that the conservatee addresses is the issue of special instructions regarding her ability to accept treatment and accept any third party assistance in facilitating the prior. Law makes the argument that she
Law makes this strange argument that since she is living in a board and care home and her mother is the payee for the public support check, she is utilizing the assistance of family members, friends or third parties within the meaning of Conservatorship of Davis
The court contends that there are several issues with her statement. The first was that the conservatee was placed in the treatment facility as a result of her being conserved. The appellate court finds that using her logic, a conservatee can never be found to be gravely disabled. A smaller note, her mother also submitted testimony that she refused to assist the conservatee with housing. The court adds that
Following Law's logic, a proposed conservatee could never be found gravely disabled in a reestablishment situation because the conservator is a willing and responsible other third party assisting the conservatee and providing for his or her needs. This could not have been the legislative intent for it would nullify Welfare and Institutions Code section 5361 permitting reestablishment of the conservatorship.
In regards to whether the conservatee would take medication voluntarily, the psychiatrist opined that she would not comply if she were discharged. Her lengthy history also demonstrated an instability with treatment. The reason she was placed on IM injections was to ensure medication compliance. She attempted to invoke the legal principal of conservatorship of Walker, but the court found that the legal basis of Walker, was contrary to her argument.
The trial court here did not instruct the jury that it must find a conservatorship may not be imposed only if a person can provide for his needs and is willing to accept treatment, as was erroneously instructed in Walker. Here, the trial court gave the proper instruction on grave disability.
The conservatee further contends that she was inappropriately found to be gravely disabled because the trial court did not instruct the jury in the difference between currently gravely disabled and becoming gravely disabled in the future and that a finding of grave disability could only be rendered if there was proof of the conservatee's present grave disability. The court responded that the trial court did not have to sua sponte instruct the jury as to such issues.
The conservatee contended that the trial court was required to instruct the jury with jury instructions relating to circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn. A factual inference is a deduction that may logically and reasonably be drawn from one or more facts established by the evidence.
The trial court again found that LPS matters are separate from criminal matters and not all of the rules apply to LPS matters. The court considered that giving Baji No 200 civil jury instruction was sufficient.
A trial court has no duty to give the requested instruction where the circumstantial evidence necessary to prove a certain mental state is not subject to any inference except that pointing to the existence of that mental state. (People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 162, 175 [133 Cal. Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881].)
The trial court affirmed that the conservatee's case was an example of where all circumstantial evidence leads to one conclusion, grave disability. Circumstantial evidence in this case represents evidence from which inferences can be drawn leading to an eventual conclusion.
Because of these reasons the appellate court found that the trial court did not err in giving instructions and upheld the previous order establishing the public conservator as conservator of the person of Law.
Procedural Posture
Appellant mental patient sought review of Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which found that she was a gravely disabled person and established a conservatorship of her person. Appellant contended that the trial court erred in denying her request for jury instructions that she is presumed not gravely disabled and relating the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the elements of grave disability.
Overview
At her conservatorship trial, appellant claimed she had no mental disorder and requested jury instructions that she was presumed not gravely disabled and instructions that related the reasonable doubt standard of proof to elements of the grave disability allegation. She also requested instructions dealing with evidence of her willingness to accept treatment. The trial court denied appellant's requests. A jury found that appellant had a mental disorder and was unable to provide for her basic personal needs. The trial court held that she was a gravely disabled person and established a conservatorship of her person. On review, the court held that appellant's requested instructions on the presumption that she was not gravely disabled and the reasonable doubt standard of proof merely repeated the instructions given by the trial court. In affirming the judgment, the court held that the trial court had no duty to give an instruction on her willingness to accept treatment where the circumstantial evidence necessary to prove a certain mental state is not subject to any inference except that pointing to the existence of that mental state.
Outcome
The court affirmed the trial court's holding that appellant was a gravely disabled person in need of conservatorship. It found that the trial court properly denied appellant's requested jury instructions.
Conservatorship of Law, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1336
The conservatee appeals a judgement order that be she be conserved by the San Diego public conservator. She contends that the trial court had inappropriately instructed the jury in regards to presuming grave disability. The appellate court found that the trial court did not err in establishing the ccnservatorship..
The conservatee at the time of her initial hearing was in the care of the residential care facility in Lemon grove. She was suffering from delusions and psychosis.. At the time her treating psychiatrist testified:
when Law refused to take her medication she exhibited bizarre behavior, inappropriate emotional reactions and expressed ideas of persecution and became suspicious of others. She became hostile and could not distinguish reality from her thoughts. On several occasions these combined symptoms led to her hospitalization. [202 Cal. App. 3d 1339]
The conservatee was being treated with IM injections of haldol Deconate. He prescribed the following because he found her mental illness to be so severe that she could not function without sustained medication. Furthermore he testified that she was unable to survive for long without necessitating hospitalization and intensive care. Testimony was also submitted stating that the conservatee was unable to remain compliant with her medication and that when off of her medication, she was unable to function and suffered from delusions of persecution. Her mother stated that the conservatee at the time was not able to live with her. The conservatee testified and opined that she did not suffer from a mental disorder. She believed that if released from conservatorship she would remain compliant on medication and plan to live at the residential treatment facility. Her social worker testified during the proceedings and stated that she had seen the conservatee well dressed and presentable.
The conservatee appeals the order. She asserts that there were several fundamental errors in instructing the jury. The appellate court reviews each contention and finds no error.
First the conservatee contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury as to the reasonable standard of proof required for a finding of grave disability. The court informed the jury that the standard of proof was the same as a criminal case and that the county had the burden of proof. In re Cons of Walker:
Conservatorship of Walker (1987) 196 Cal. App. 3d 1082, 1099 [242 Cal. Rptr. 289], "[t]he trial court may properly refuse the additional instructions if they are repetitive and merely restate legal principles in another manner. [Citation.]" There was no error in the instruction as given and in refusing the additional instruction requested by Law.
The court found there was no error in the court's part in instructing the jury. The court found that omitting some instructions was acceptable as it may reduce redundancy.
The conservatee also contends that the court erred in not instructing the jury that she be presumed to be gravely disabled until other wise proven. The court affirms her assertion but does state that that error was a harmless error and no prejudice resulted from a lack of instruction. The court states that that assertion exists to insure that
"[t]he only effect of the presumption is to insure that the state proves its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury here was fully instructed as to the effect of the presumption and could not have been prejudiced by the failure to denominate the presumption." (196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1099.)
The next point that the conservatee addresses is the issue of special instructions regarding her ability to accept treatment and accept any third party assistance in facilitating the prior. Law makes the argument that she
Law makes this strange argument that since she is living in a board and care home and her mother is the payee for the public support check, she is utilizing the assistance of family members, friends or third parties within the meaning of Conservatorship of Davis
The court contends that there are several issues with her statement. The first was that the conservatee was placed in the treatment facility as a result of her being conserved. The appellate court finds that using her logic, a conservatee can never be found to be gravely disabled. A smaller note, her mother also submitted testimony that she refused to assist the conservatee with housing. The court adds that
Following Law's logic, a proposed conservatee could never be found gravely disabled in a reestablishment situation because the conservator is a willing and responsible other third party assisting the conservatee and providing for his or her needs. This could not have been the legislative intent for it would nullify Welfare and Institutions Code section 5361 permitting reestablishment of the conservatorship.
In regards to whether the conservatee would take medication voluntarily, the psychiatrist opined that she would not comply if she were discharged. Her lengthy history also demonstrated an instability with treatment. The reason she was placed on IM injections was to ensure medication compliance. She attempted to invoke the legal principal of conservatorship of Walker, but the court found that the legal basis of Walker, was contrary to her argument.
The trial court here did not instruct the jury that it must find a conservatorship may not be imposed only if a person can provide for his needs and is willing to accept treatment, as was erroneously instructed in Walker. Here, the trial court gave the proper instruction on grave disability.
The conservatee further contends that she was inappropriately found to be gravely disabled because the trial court did not instruct the jury in the difference between currently gravely disabled and becoming gravely disabled in the future and that a finding of grave disability could only be rendered if there was proof of the conservatee's present grave disability. The court responded that the trial court did not have to sua sponte instruct the jury as to such issues.
The conservatee contended that the trial court was required to instruct the jury with jury instructions relating to circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact from which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn. A factual inference is a deduction that may logically and reasonably be drawn from one or more facts established by the evidence.
The trial court again found that LPS matters are separate from criminal matters and not all of the rules apply to LPS matters. The court considered that giving Baji No 200 civil jury instruction was sufficient.
A trial court has no duty to give the requested instruction where the circumstantial evidence necessary to prove a certain mental state is not subject to any inference except that pointing to the existence of that mental state. (People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 162, 175 [133 Cal. Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881].)
The trial court affirmed that the conservatee's case was an example of where all circumstantial evidence leads to one conclusion, grave disability. Circumstantial evidence in this case represents evidence from which inferences can be drawn leading to an eventual conclusion.
Because of these reasons the appellate court found that the trial court did not err in giving instructions and upheld the previous order establishing the public conservator as conservator of the person of Law.
Procedural Posture
Appellant mental patient sought review of Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which found that she was a gravely disabled person and established a conservatorship of her person. Appellant contended that the trial court erred in denying her request for jury instructions that she is presumed not gravely disabled and relating the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the elements of grave disability.
Overview
At her conservatorship trial, appellant claimed she had no mental disorder and requested jury instructions that she was presumed not gravely disabled and instructions that related the reasonable doubt standard of proof to elements of the grave disability allegation. She also requested instructions dealing with evidence of her willingness to accept treatment. The trial court denied appellant's requests. A jury found that appellant had a mental disorder and was unable to provide for her basic personal needs. The trial court held that she was a gravely disabled person and established a conservatorship of her person. On review, the court held that appellant's requested instructions on the presumption that she was not gravely disabled and the reasonable doubt standard of proof merely repeated the instructions given by the trial court. In affirming the judgment, the court held that the trial court had no duty to give an instruction on her willingness to accept treatment where the circumstantial evidence necessary to prove a certain mental state is not subject to any inference except that pointing to the existence of that mental state.
Outcome
The court affirmed the trial court's holding that appellant was a gravely disabled person in need of conservatorship. It found that the trial court properly denied appellant's requested jury instructions.