Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and 27 c.F.R section 478.11

How will the end of Chevron deference affect 27 C.F.R. section 478.11 and the ATF's definition of adjudicated mentally defective?
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With Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 143 S. Ct. 2429 (2023) in this opinion summer, two cases Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Commerce, that made it to Supreme Court review will change how Chevron deference is applied. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. is the controlling jurisprudence to administrative law that states a reviewing court must defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of any ambiguous statute that the agency administers. 

To understand Chevron, very simply summarized, Congress codifies rules that govern different aspects of the law. For second amendment issues, they are codified in 18 U.S.C. 922 and other statutes. Congress delegates the task of administering and overseeing the U.S.C to BATFE [citation]. There the BATFE determines what the meanings in U.S.C are and how they enforced in 27 C.F.R and other statutes. This is subject to great deference to ATF's reasonable interpretation whenever a challenge to the C.F.R. arises. With these two cases, petitioners challenge the seemingly unilateral power that congress vests in the BATFE citing that federal agencies should not be given such great deference to defining terms in C.F.R.


At step one of the Chevron deference analysis for reviewing BATFE’s interpretation of 27 C.F.R section 479.11. First a reviewing court, employing the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, evaluates whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue through analysis of bills and other controlling authorities in 18 U.S.C.A. § 922, the Gun Control Act, the Brady Act, and the Bipartisan Safe Communities Act. The court sees through the language of the above, whether Congress has directly addressed the precise question at issue. A reviewing court “begins with the language utilized by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of the words in that code accurately conveys the legislative purpose”. see Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252, 124 S.Ct. 1756, 158 L.Ed.2d 529 (2004) If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of a Chevron analysis; for the court. Furthermore, BATFE, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. See Cigar Association of America v. United States Food and Drug Administration (D.C. Cir. 2021) 5 F.4th 68, 77. However, if the statute considered as whole is ambiguous, then the court moves to the second step per Chevron. Here it reviews for an agency's interpretation of a statute the agency. The court under Chevron must defer to any permissible construction of the statute adopted by BATFE. Where legislative delegation to BATFE on a particular legislative inquiry is implicit rather than explicit, a court may not substitute its own construction of said statutory provision in the place of a reasonable interpretation made by BATFE. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837.
 
 
18 U.S.C.A. § 922 (g)(4) holds that anyone who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution may not possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.
 
 
Federal regulations tasked to BATFE does not clarify the meaning of the words “mental institution” apply to “a person in a mental institution for observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 clarifies that the meaning committed to a mental institution shall include any “formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority. The term also includes a commitment to a mental institution involuntarily. The term includes commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness. It also includes commitments for other reasons, such as for drug use. The term does not include a person in a mental institution for observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution”. Under Chevron deference is given to BATFE that its interpretation and statutory construction are permissible and comport with the GCA. That text is relatively unclear when it comes to defining what a lawful authority is. When BATFE has not reasonably clarified the question at issue of what other persons or agencies constitute a lawful authority, BATFE may fill this gap in their legislative rule with a reasonable interpretation of their statutory text but their interpretive rule[s] are not given deference under Chevron.
 
 
Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo (D.C. Cir. 2022) 45 F.4th 359, cert. granted in part sub nom. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2023) 143 S.Ct. 2429 [216 L.Ed.2d 414]