David B. v. Superior Court- Parent's case

 
123 Cal.App.4th 768
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.
DAVID B., Petitioner
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT of Orange County, Respondent;
Orange County Social Services Agency et al., Real Parties in Interest.
 
David B. v. Superior Ct., 123 Cal. App. 4th 768, 789, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 336, 352 (2004)
 
This case is the case parent’s counsel frequently refers to when they are making a case at the .22 hearing. Like Constance K, the court will be looking at factors beyond substantial compliance with the case plan. The ____ of this case takes from the angle of family preservation unlike Constance K which focused on the child’s need for permanency and safety. Although this remains the overruling basis for dependency jurisdiction, the David B. court focused on that the “first priority when child dependency proceedings are commenced; reunification services implement the law's strong preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all possible”. The David B. court noted importantly that after the disposition hearing, there is a statutory presumption that the child will be returned to parental custody, and the juvenile court must return the child home of parent unless it determines there would be a risk of detriment. Additionally, the court clarifies that this standard does not refer to a parent who is less than ideal. The court clarified that this did not mean that if a parent did not benefit from the reunification services as much as might have been hoped, or seemed less capable than the foster parent, they were deemed a risk of detriment. The court wished to impress that risk of detriment meant serious incapacity in a core aspect of parenting and safety.
 
 
Like the Constance K. court, the David B. court weighed many of the same criteria. Each will be discussed seriatim.
 
When considering whether to terminate services based on a lack of parenting skills, the court looks to the parent’s understanding and implementation of the most important parenting concepts, such as security, important nutrition, safety from domestic violence, proper hygiene, attendance to vital healthcare, and education. The court does not consider whether a child's preference for minor aspects of their life such as clothes or food preferences. The father in this case understood the basic needs of having clean diapers, balanced diet, and safety of the home. However, since he was a new father and did not have much time to bond with the minor, he frequently asked questions of the foster parent such as what was the minor’s food preference. Sometimes the father would also “seek guidance whenever a problem arises, the social worker acknowledged that “[i]t's not a regular thing” and agreed that “[s]eeking advice is always a positive thing”. Unlike Constance K. where the father frequently asked questions and was unable to finish the visit because he was unable to manage the children in his home for extended periods of time, David B asked questions so he could better understand the minor’s preferences and provided logical reasoning for his actions as he cited that the foster parents knew the minor far better than he did at the time.
 
 
When considering whether the parent benefitted from his services, the father in this case engaged in his services and went beyond to ask questions relevant to his child’s care.
 
So he “took the teacher aside and asked her, **345 ‘Okay, I've got ... a two-year old. What should I do?’ ” She advised him to “listen to the child, and watch what she does and watch every movement she does. And pick up what she's doing a learn from it.” He also learned “to be there for [Susan], and love her and try to teach her what I know to the best of my knowledge.”
 
 
 
 
He also participated in his DV services and took the lessons he learned from them and separated himself from the perpetrators of domestic violence in his life. Unlike Constance K. who did participate in the services but did not effectuate the necessary changes the court was looking to in determining whether the minor was safe. The services need not to be perfect, but substantial enough for the parent to make the change to eliminate the risk factors to the minor.
 
 
 
Another smaller fact but important none the less was whether father understood the importance of medical care. The father at the time did not have medical insurance for the minor and had to rely on the foster parent for communication about the minor’s medical care. When asked the father opined that if there were an emergency he had a specific plan as to access care for the minor. Although there is not more in the record about the father’s specific plans for care, this appeared to satisfy the appellate court.
 
 
Finally, as with the Constance K court, the trial court examined the importance of the bond between the father and the minor. The minor in David B was not as closely bonded to the father given that the minor was in placement from a very young age. The appellate court contends that the father was not granted enough time to bond with the minor through no fault of his own. He participated in his services and made substantial effort to bond with the minor during the visits. This case should be differentiated from Constance K. where the court was examining whether severing the bond the minor had with the foster parents was detrimental to the minor’s health. In this case, the court emphasized that since the focus of these series of review hearings focus on the sufficiency of services provided.
 
When providing reunification services, the preference for maintaining family relationships did not depend upon father's ability to make two-year-old daughter feel bonded to him especially when he had never had the opportunity to parent her on a day-to-day basis.
 
The issue rather was whether placing child in her father's care represented some danger to her physical or emotional well-being.
 
It is after the termination of services and the setting of the .26 hearing date that the court considers the bond between parent and child as they weight the Autumn H factors.
 
In totality the court is examining the facts in the record to determine whether the parent’s compliance with their case plan along with the above factors demonstrate amelioration of the risk of detriment. The court is not seeking 100% change. Rather, they are looking for substantial effort and changes to warrant HOP. The court is not looking to judge the parents at the same level that they would someone born with the privilege of wealth and stable intergenerational wealth. The court covers this as counsel may fall into the trap of judging the parent against their own personal historical standards.
 
 
 
The court summarizes their sentiments:
We do not get ideal parents in the dependency system. But the fact of the matter is that we do not get ideal parents anywhere. The State of California is not in the business of evaluating parents and redistributing their offspring based upon perceived merit. The parents who come through the dependency system are more in need of help than most. If we are lucky, they are parents who can learn to overcome the problems which landed their children in the system, and who can demonstrate the dedication and ability to provide for their children's needs in an appropriate manner. They will not turn into superstars, and they will not win the lottery and move into a beachfront condo two blocks from a perfect school.
 
David B. v. Superior Ct., 123 Cal. App. 4th 768, 789, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 336, 352 (2004)
 
Based on the appellate court’s closing editorialization, it ordered that the petition for extraordinary relief is granted and that the trial court issue a new order based on two scenarios. First it must either show that the services provided to father during the final six-month reunification period were inadequate, and require the department to offer additional reunification services. If, after the provision of such services, the father is still unable to provide minor with a suitable living condition, the court may reissue the order terminating services and schedule the permanency hearing.
 
 
 
 
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.
DAVID B., Petitioner
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT of Orange County, Respondent;
Orange County Social Services Agency et al., Real Parties in Interest.
No. G033918.
Oct. 28, 2004.
 
Synopsis
Background: In child dependency proceedings, the Superior Court of Orange County, No. DP007141, Richard E. Behn, J., entered order setting permanency planning hearing after finding that low-income father's two-year-old daughter could not be safely released to his custody. Father petitioned for writ of mandate.
Holdings: The Court of Appeal, Bedsworth, J., held that:
1 reunification services addressing father's alleged housing problems were inadequate, and
2 trial court improperly relied on supervising agency's discretion in deciding housing issue.