207 Cal.App.3d 1240
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.
In re Steven AZZARELLA on Habeas Corpus.
The primary issue around this case is the matter of whether the standard of proof for writ of habeas corpus should have been the county’s burden of proof or that of the petitioner and whether the motion to increase the burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence was the appropriate standard. The appellate court cited the importance of balancing patient's rights, previous evidence in record, and burden on the county and thus upheld the trial court’s orders.
The patient filed a writ of habeas corpus requesting release from a 14 day intensive treatment period. At the date of the evidentiary hearing the county filed a motion requesting that the burden of proof be increased or that the petitioner bear the burden of proof instead of the county. The trial court denied the motion and a timely appeal followed.
The appellate court upon reviewing the record rendered this judgement
WHO CARRIES BURDEN OF PROOF
County asserted that in traditionally habeas corpus proceedings the petitioner must bear the burden of proof. However, the literature suggests otherwise. Habeas corpus proceedings are extraordinary and collateral attacks on either an issue of denial of constitutional rights or the legality of a period of confinement. In the matter of § 5276 proceedings writ of habeas corpus matters serves as the only source of review of a cert review hearing which are often conducted in the hospital by a court officer not necessarily a judge. Also the trial court only has two recourses; order the person released or further detain the person for the entire hold. The court lacks the discretion to deny the petition. Also with normal writ of habeas corpus, there is a presumption of regularity in which there is an assumption
That officials “have properly discharged their official duties” in the course of making decisions—that they’ve acted with proper motives, haven’t lied and have generally comported themselves as ethical professionals.
In writs under § 5276, there is no such presumption due to the lack of independent review with presumption of presumption of regularity. Because of this the county bears the burden of proof in a writ of habeas corpus matter.
WHAT SHOULD THE BURDEN OF PROOF BE
In normal civil matters the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. Mental health proceedings generally are considered civil matters. The question that arises is whether due process matters regarding involuntary commitment should bear the same burden of proof.
In Addington v. Texas, supra, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, the United States Supreme Court determined that the standard of proof for an indefinite civil must be no less than clear and convincing because of the significant deprivation of liberty that results from the commitment as well as the stigma attached. In Conservatorship of Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d 219, 152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1, the California Supreme Court determined that a petitioner in a LPS conservatorship proceeding must establish grave disability by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, again because of the significant deprivation of liberty and the social stigma resulting from the determination.
Following this line of judgement, the county could assert that a higher burden of proof would be appropriate for a 14 day hold.
However the appellate court dissented providing the following reasoning. It reasoned that there are no legal disabilities imposed (license revocation, right to contract, or voting rights) during a 14 day hold. Also, the treatment is local usually in the local hospital not a move to a distant state hospital or IMD. 14 day holds are considered as a last resort treatment and the treatment provided are not to impose on personal liberties absent a proper order to show cause. The court reasoned that some rights are lost but not as severe as in Roulet or Addington.
The court also reasons that in order to arrive at a 14 day hold and subsequent writ of habeas corpus proceeding, the patient must have already gone through detention under § 5150. The person administering the 5150 must have had probable cause to detain based on evidence of observable mental disorder that makes them gravely disabled, danger to self, or danger to others.
In addition, during the 14 day certification, the notice must once more provide specific facts that lead to the assumption of GD/DS/DO.
Requiring some objective, verifiable evidence of dangerousness or grave disability eliminates some of the possibility of error inherent in the concededly vague definition of mental disorder or mental illness, suggesting that a stricter standard of proof is not warranted.
Finally, the court determined that if there was a higher burden of proof on the county to make its case then it would increase the work and burden on the county with already limited resources. Higher burden of proof would require that there be more evidence, statements, testimony, and possibly expert witnesses thus increasing the cost and time required. Because of limited resources more persons would be released early given that the hospital and court system does not have the time to hear such matters and the hospital would like to avoid incurring such costs.
PATIENT
In this case the patient lacked mental illness that rendered him gravely disability such that the imposing a higher burden of proof would have not rendered a different judgement meaning that if the county did not have a preponderance of the evidence showing then they definitely did not have clear and convincing evidence. In short the county did demonstrate mental illness but not to the degree warranting intensive treatment for 14 days as the patient was not GD/DS/DO. The appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court.
In summary, we determine that the County must bear the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion, to justify the certification. We further determine that the appropriate standard of proof in these proceedings is preponderance of the evidence and that the same is constitutionally permissible.
207 Cal.App.3d 1240
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.
In re Steven AZZARELLA on Habeas Corpus.
No. E004149.
Jan. 27, 1989.
Review Denied May 18, 1989.
Synopsis
Detainee filed writ of habeas corpus challenging detention by certification for intensive treatment. The Superior Court, Riverside County, Robert J. Timlin, J., granted petition, and county appealed. The Court of Appeal, Hollenhorst, J., held that: (1) county had burden of proof to justify certification; (2) appropriate standard of proof was by preponderance of evidence; and (3) county did not meet burden.
Affirmed.
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.
In re Steven AZZARELLA on Habeas Corpus.
The primary issue around this case is the matter of whether the standard of proof for writ of habeas corpus should have been the county’s burden of proof or that of the petitioner and whether the motion to increase the burden of proof of preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence was the appropriate standard. The appellate court cited the importance of balancing patient's rights, previous evidence in record, and burden on the county and thus upheld the trial court’s orders.
The patient filed a writ of habeas corpus requesting release from a 14 day intensive treatment period. At the date of the evidentiary hearing the county filed a motion requesting that the burden of proof be increased or that the petitioner bear the burden of proof instead of the county. The trial court denied the motion and a timely appeal followed.
The appellate court upon reviewing the record rendered this judgement
WHO CARRIES BURDEN OF PROOF
County asserted that in traditionally habeas corpus proceedings the petitioner must bear the burden of proof. However, the literature suggests otherwise. Habeas corpus proceedings are extraordinary and collateral attacks on either an issue of denial of constitutional rights or the legality of a period of confinement. In the matter of § 5276 proceedings writ of habeas corpus matters serves as the only source of review of a cert review hearing which are often conducted in the hospital by a court officer not necessarily a judge. Also the trial court only has two recourses; order the person released or further detain the person for the entire hold. The court lacks the discretion to deny the petition. Also with normal writ of habeas corpus, there is a presumption of regularity in which there is an assumption
That officials “have properly discharged their official duties” in the course of making decisions—that they’ve acted with proper motives, haven’t lied and have generally comported themselves as ethical professionals.
In writs under § 5276, there is no such presumption due to the lack of independent review with presumption of presumption of regularity. Because of this the county bears the burden of proof in a writ of habeas corpus matter.
WHAT SHOULD THE BURDEN OF PROOF BE
In normal civil matters the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. Mental health proceedings generally are considered civil matters. The question that arises is whether due process matters regarding involuntary commitment should bear the same burden of proof.
In Addington v. Texas, supra, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, the United States Supreme Court determined that the standard of proof for an indefinite civil must be no less than clear and convincing because of the significant deprivation of liberty that results from the commitment as well as the stigma attached. In Conservatorship of Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d 219, 152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1, the California Supreme Court determined that a petitioner in a LPS conservatorship proceeding must establish grave disability by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, again because of the significant deprivation of liberty and the social stigma resulting from the determination.
Following this line of judgement, the county could assert that a higher burden of proof would be appropriate for a 14 day hold.
However the appellate court dissented providing the following reasoning. It reasoned that there are no legal disabilities imposed (license revocation, right to contract, or voting rights) during a 14 day hold. Also, the treatment is local usually in the local hospital not a move to a distant state hospital or IMD. 14 day holds are considered as a last resort treatment and the treatment provided are not to impose on personal liberties absent a proper order to show cause. The court reasoned that some rights are lost but not as severe as in Roulet or Addington.
The court also reasons that in order to arrive at a 14 day hold and subsequent writ of habeas corpus proceeding, the patient must have already gone through detention under § 5150. The person administering the 5150 must have had probable cause to detain based on evidence of observable mental disorder that makes them gravely disabled, danger to self, or danger to others.
In addition, during the 14 day certification, the notice must once more provide specific facts that lead to the assumption of GD/DS/DO.
Requiring some objective, verifiable evidence of dangerousness or grave disability eliminates some of the possibility of error inherent in the concededly vague definition of mental disorder or mental illness, suggesting that a stricter standard of proof is not warranted.
Finally, the court determined that if there was a higher burden of proof on the county to make its case then it would increase the work and burden on the county with already limited resources. Higher burden of proof would require that there be more evidence, statements, testimony, and possibly expert witnesses thus increasing the cost and time required. Because of limited resources more persons would be released early given that the hospital and court system does not have the time to hear such matters and the hospital would like to avoid incurring such costs.
PATIENT
In this case the patient lacked mental illness that rendered him gravely disability such that the imposing a higher burden of proof would have not rendered a different judgement meaning that if the county did not have a preponderance of the evidence showing then they definitely did not have clear and convincing evidence. In short the county did demonstrate mental illness but not to the degree warranting intensive treatment for 14 days as the patient was not GD/DS/DO. The appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court.
In summary, we determine that the County must bear the burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion, to justify the certification. We further determine that the appropriate standard of proof in these proceedings is preponderance of the evidence and that the same is constitutionally permissible.
207 Cal.App.3d 1240
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.
In re Steven AZZARELLA on Habeas Corpus.
No. E004149.
Jan. 27, 1989.
Review Denied May 18, 1989.
Synopsis
Detainee filed writ of habeas corpus challenging detention by certification for intensive treatment. The Superior Court, Riverside County, Robert J. Timlin, J., granted petition, and county appealed. The Court of Appeal, Hollenhorst, J., held that: (1) county had burden of proof to justify certification; (2) appropriate standard of proof was by preponderance of evidence; and (3) county did not meet burden.
Affirmed.