Investigation report and Conservatorship of the Person of GLENYS IVEY.
231 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986
Filed: October 21st, 1986
This appellate opinion was a consolidation of several cases. Kind of similar to a global plea but with appeals.
This case is a consolidation of several appeals by multiple conservatees who have raised the issue of whether transmittal of the investigation report to consrvatee’s counsel satisfies the requirement that the conservatees be properly noticed pursuant to § Welf and Inst Code § 5354. The appellate court found that by bare minimum the court must effectuate notice by mailing of the report to the proposed conservatee. The court did find that the due process was not violated when the report was mailed to conservatee’s counsel as the court considers that counsel effectively explained the contents of the report with the conservatee.
The center issue around this appeal is the interpretation of “transmit”. Conservatees contend that the trial court had erred in not properly personally serving them the conservatorship investigation report. The conservatees cite Welf and Inst Code § 5354 (a) A copy of the report shall be transmitted to the individual who originally recommended conservatorship, to the person or agency, if any, recommended to serve as conservator, and to the person recommended for conservatorship. The court may receive the report in evidence and may read and consider the contents thereof in rendering its judgment. (1) The defendant and the defendant's counsel may retain their copy.
The conservatees contend that the specific language in the law mandates that the conservatee’s be the ones to receive the report. The appellate court returned citing
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) also defines "transmit" as "[t]o send or transfer from one person or place to another, or to communicate." (P. 1344.) As the section provides the report shall be transmitted to the proposed conservatee, its plain meaning requires at minimum the mailing of the report directly to the proposed conservatee. The Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs. (Great Lake Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal. 3d 152, 155 [137 Cal. Rptr. 154, 561 P.2d 244].)
Because the legislature at the time did not account for a lawyer for the defendant, there is no mention of serving the conservatee via the lawyer. There does lie potential that the legislature may have included such provisions should they have been written at the time.
Due to the lack of clarity, the public conservator contends that Civ Procedure Code § 1015 allows the report to be sent to the conservatee’s counsel. The code states:
“[I]n all cases where a party has an attorney in the action or proceeding, the service of papers, when required, must be upon the attorney instead of the party, except the service of subpoenas, of writs, and other process issued in the suit."
However, at the same time the law mandates that any existing procedure is overruled by Welf and Inst Code § 5354 where applicable. Unless an appellate court has previously expressed an exception, a special statute such as Welf and Inst Code supersedes and takes precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject. Regardless of whether the special provision was made before after the general procedure, it will supersede the general procedure. (in re. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 392, 420.
Since Welf and Inst Code § 5354 and Civil Pro § 1015 cannot exist together without violating § 5354, the court found that § 5354 takes precedent over civil procedure when it comes to handling matters of the conservatorship investigation report. Because of this the court found that failure to deliver the report to the conservatee personally contravened with the statute and the trial court had erred.
Since LPS conservatees face a serious deprivation of liberty, the court must ensure that all rights are preserved and that due process is properly and wholly effectuated. As a result, the instant court must at a minimum mail the court documents to the conservatee personally. However, despite all this the court did not find that failure to properly serve the conservatee was grounds for dismissing the petition entirely. The court sustained the petition in lieu of the appeal.
In the matter of the other conservatorships, the appellate court addresses other issues. In the conservatorship of Stulken the conservatee contends his counsel failed to have a direct consultation with him as required by Probate Code § 1828, subdivision (b) and therefore is reversible error. Conservatee contends that the court addressed the conservatees as a whole not individually. However, the proposed conservatee acknowledges that at his hearing the court advised him, about his right to be represented by legal counsel, the right to object to the appointment of a conservator, to object to any of the disabilities, the right to object to the placement level, and the right to a jury trial with a unanimous verdict and burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. The court record demonstrated that the court advised the proposed conservatee in accordance to Probate Code § 1828 (a). The court found that it is not required to provide individual consultation nor record of consultations. The consultation with counsel serves to obtain the conservatee’s opinion on conservatorship.
The court *1568 here invited consultation by asking if there were any questions and offering to answer them.
The court found that any errors were moot and non-reversible.
Other contentions that counsel did not effectively communicate the issues in the petition were dismissed as moot as the court assumed that counsel was competent and effectively communicated with the proposed conservatees.
Procedural Posture
Appellant conservatees sought review of a judgment from the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which appointed respondent conservators, after finding appellants gravely disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5000-5464.
Overview
A trial court found appellant conservatees gravely disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5000-5464, and appointed respondent conservators. Appellants sought review. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that a statutory violation neither denied one appellant due process of law nor deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Based on that opinion, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the other appellants. The court's finding that mailing a conservatorship investigation report directly to appellants was required did not require reversal. Based on the trial counsel's assumed competence the court was satisfied that appellants' lawyers fully communicated with it about the contents of an investigation report. Accordingly, there was no reason to reverse the judgment in a second appellant's case, or in the cases of the third and fourth appellants, based on the failure to transmit the investigation reports pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5354. Finally, since a fifth appellant received a copy of the investigation report, there was no basis for his argument concerning transmission of the report.
Outcome
The court affirmed a trial court's judgment appointing respondent conservators for appellant conservatees because a violation of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act did not deny due process or deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Appellants' lawyers fully communicated with them about the contents of a conservatorship investigation report. The court's conclusion that mailing the report directly to appellants was required did not require reversal.
231 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986
Filed: October 21st, 1986
This appellate opinion was a consolidation of several cases. Kind of similar to a global plea but with appeals.
This case is a consolidation of several appeals by multiple conservatees who have raised the issue of whether transmittal of the investigation report to consrvatee’s counsel satisfies the requirement that the conservatees be properly noticed pursuant to § Welf and Inst Code § 5354. The appellate court found that by bare minimum the court must effectuate notice by mailing of the report to the proposed conservatee. The court did find that the due process was not violated when the report was mailed to conservatee’s counsel as the court considers that counsel effectively explained the contents of the report with the conservatee.
The center issue around this appeal is the interpretation of “transmit”. Conservatees contend that the trial court had erred in not properly personally serving them the conservatorship investigation report. The conservatees cite Welf and Inst Code § 5354 (a) A copy of the report shall be transmitted to the individual who originally recommended conservatorship, to the person or agency, if any, recommended to serve as conservator, and to the person recommended for conservatorship. The court may receive the report in evidence and may read and consider the contents thereof in rendering its judgment. (1) The defendant and the defendant's counsel may retain their copy.
The conservatees contend that the specific language in the law mandates that the conservatee’s be the ones to receive the report. The appellate court returned citing
Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) also defines "transmit" as "[t]o send or transfer from one person or place to another, or to communicate." (P. 1344.) As the section provides the report shall be transmitted to the proposed conservatee, its plain meaning requires at minimum the mailing of the report directly to the proposed conservatee. The Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs. (Great Lake Properties, Inc. v. City of El Segundo (1977) 19 Cal. 3d 152, 155 [137 Cal. Rptr. 154, 561 P.2d 244].)
Because the legislature at the time did not account for a lawyer for the defendant, there is no mention of serving the conservatee via the lawyer. There does lie potential that the legislature may have included such provisions should they have been written at the time.
Due to the lack of clarity, the public conservator contends that Civ Procedure Code § 1015 allows the report to be sent to the conservatee’s counsel. The code states:
“[I]n all cases where a party has an attorney in the action or proceeding, the service of papers, when required, must be upon the attorney instead of the party, except the service of subpoenas, of writs, and other process issued in the suit."
However, at the same time the law mandates that any existing procedure is overruled by Welf and Inst Code § 5354 where applicable. Unless an appellate court has previously expressed an exception, a special statute such as Welf and Inst Code supersedes and takes precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject. Regardless of whether the special provision was made before after the general procedure, it will supersede the general procedure. (in re. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 392, 420.
Since Welf and Inst Code § 5354 and Civil Pro § 1015 cannot exist together without violating § 5354, the court found that § 5354 takes precedent over civil procedure when it comes to handling matters of the conservatorship investigation report. Because of this the court found that failure to deliver the report to the conservatee personally contravened with the statute and the trial court had erred.
Since LPS conservatees face a serious deprivation of liberty, the court must ensure that all rights are preserved and that due process is properly and wholly effectuated. As a result, the instant court must at a minimum mail the court documents to the conservatee personally. However, despite all this the court did not find that failure to properly serve the conservatee was grounds for dismissing the petition entirely. The court sustained the petition in lieu of the appeal.
In the matter of the other conservatorships, the appellate court addresses other issues. In the conservatorship of Stulken the conservatee contends his counsel failed to have a direct consultation with him as required by Probate Code § 1828, subdivision (b) and therefore is reversible error. Conservatee contends that the court addressed the conservatees as a whole not individually. However, the proposed conservatee acknowledges that at his hearing the court advised him, about his right to be represented by legal counsel, the right to object to the appointment of a conservator, to object to any of the disabilities, the right to object to the placement level, and the right to a jury trial with a unanimous verdict and burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. The court record demonstrated that the court advised the proposed conservatee in accordance to Probate Code § 1828 (a). The court found that it is not required to provide individual consultation nor record of consultations. The consultation with counsel serves to obtain the conservatee’s opinion on conservatorship.
The court *1568 here invited consultation by asking if there were any questions and offering to answer them.
The court found that any errors were moot and non-reversible.
Other contentions that counsel did not effectively communicate the issues in the petition were dismissed as moot as the court assumed that counsel was competent and effectively communicated with the proposed conservatees.
Procedural Posture
Appellant conservatees sought review of a judgment from the Superior Court of San Diego County (California), which appointed respondent conservators, after finding appellants gravely disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5000-5464.
Overview
A trial court found appellant conservatees gravely disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5000-5464, and appointed respondent conservators. Appellants sought review. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that a statutory violation neither denied one appellant due process of law nor deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Based on that opinion, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the other appellants. The court's finding that mailing a conservatorship investigation report directly to appellants was required did not require reversal. Based on the trial counsel's assumed competence the court was satisfied that appellants' lawyers fully communicated with it about the contents of an investigation report. Accordingly, there was no reason to reverse the judgment in a second appellant's case, or in the cases of the third and fourth appellants, based on the failure to transmit the investigation reports pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5354. Finally, since a fifth appellant received a copy of the investigation report, there was no basis for his argument concerning transmission of the report.
Outcome
The court affirmed a trial court's judgment appointing respondent conservators for appellant conservatees because a violation of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act did not deny due process or deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Appellants' lawyers fully communicated with them about the contents of a conservatorship investigation report. The court's conclusion that mailing the report directly to appellants was required did not require reversal.