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PROCEDURAL POSTURE
CASE SPECIFIC ! ISSUES PRESENTED Defendant moves to dismiss the temporary conservatorship because the statute of limitations on the temporary conservatorship has expired a little over six months ago. Defendant contends that the Public Guardian initiated the temporary conservatorship on an inappropriate factual basis for grave disability. Although Defendant acknowledges that the core facts of grave disability are beyond the scope of this motion to dismiss, they plan a small role in why his counsel and the Public Guardian attempted to toll the statute far beyond what is considered reasonable. However, Defendant avers that the facts of his case do not present a compelling enough reason to toll the statute 7 or 8 months past the allowable time limit for temporary conservatorships. Defendant alleges that the criteria for equitable tolling do not apply here and the temporary conservatorship should be dismissed. DISCUSSION A. The Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Is Not Applicable To All Statutes Equitable tolling is a “judicially created, non-statutory doctrine” that “suspend[s] or extend[s] a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness”. McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99. Our courts draw authority to toll a filing deadline from their inherent equitable powers — not from what the Legislature has declared in any particular statute. The authority by which courts equitably toll a statute’s limitations comes not from any statute, but instead from the court’s judicial power which itself derives from the Constitution, and the Laws of the United States. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2; (Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 592 (9th Cir. 2020)). Thus courts may presume that statutory deadlines can be subject to equitable tolling even if the statute does not explicitly address it. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs (1990) 498 U.S. 89, 95–96. The power to employ equitable tolling doesn't mean it will apply in every or even most cases. Many cases have explained that equitable tolling is a narrow remedy that applies only “occasionally and in special situations”. (Addison v. State of California, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 316, 146 Cal.Rptr. 224, 578 P.2d 941); (see also Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363, 370, 73 P.3d 517, 523 (2003)). Any conclusion that the Legislature hadn't intended to prohibit a statute of limitations from being tolled ought not construe equitable tolling into “a cure-all for an entirely common state of affairs.” (Wallace v. Kato (2007) 549 U.S. 384, 396). Courts must instead carefully examine the facts of each case to determine whether “justice and fairness” demand that the limitations period be tolled. (Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1072, 1081, 282 Cal.Rptr. 445, 811 P.2d 737). The tolling doctrine allows courts, “in carefully considered situations,” to exercise their inherent equitable powers to “soften the harsh impact of technical rules” by tolling statutes of limitations. (Addison, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 316, 146 Cal.Rptr. 224, 578 P.2d 941). Furthermore, equitable tolling may be applied in situations where, “despite all due diligence, the party requesting tolling is unable to obtain vital information”. Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Case law additionally adds that equitable tolling doctrines should not apply if equitable tolling is “inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute” (United States v. Beggerly (1998) 524 U.S. 38, 48, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32). Welfare and Institutions Code does not address tolling its rigid deadlines nor is there is case law that address such the issue. Therefore, equitable tolling of the deadlines for California's involuntary holds, temporary conservatorship, and permanent LPS Conservatorship remains an unanswered query that is just now being brought to a court's attention. As with other general equitable principles, application of the equitable tolling doctrine requires a balancing act betwee the deprivations to the Defendant’s rights against the important public interest expressly stated in the LPS Act. (Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 321, 578 P.2d 941, 945 (1978). Defendant asserts that given the totality of the circumstances this court would conclude that situational shortcomings such as beds or staffing shortages and the Public Conservator's interest in continuing supervised treatment cannot be reconciled with permitting unfettered equitable tolling as the LPS Act has already achieved the balancing act between state interests and patients' rights via its various legal safeguards and deadlines. B. DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT THERE ARE NO EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING TOLLING THE STATUTE FOR A LENGTHY PERIOD Defendant alleges that the Public Guardian has yet to proffer a compelling enough reason to continue his temporary conservatorship ___ times pushing his proposed permanent conservatorship hearing date more than 6 months out from the establishment of the temporary conservatorship. Defendant points out that the code governing the timelines of LPS conservatorship hearings demands that courts adhere to a rigid timeline. He states that although the code states that the court may extend the temporary conservatorship until the matter has been decided, it may not continue the case for more than 180 days pursuant to Welf & I C §5352.1. Furthermore, if the conservatee demands a jury trial the court has up to six months to complete jury selection and to hold the trial or else the case must be dismissed. Welf & I C §5352.1. Defendant asserts that the Public Guardian and the hospital have had plenty of time to make an assessment as to whether he is currently gravely disabled within the meaning of Welf & I C § 5008 et seq, and that that determination should have been made within the statutory framework. Given the nature of the deprivations faced by conservatee, Defendant asserts that these timelines are a bright line rule, not intended to be subject to equitable tolling even when the conservatee may be found currently gravely disabled. As discussed, ante Defendant, made timely requests for a rehearing and a jury trial. All times Defendant was informed by the Public Guardian or his counsel that San Francisco does not hold jury trials. Defendant acknowledges that the court does bear that inherent right to extend the hearing beyond the statutory framework, but avers that the Public Conservator has yet to offer a very compelling reason to continue the hearing six months beyond what Welf. & Inst. Code § 5352.1 allows. The Public Conservator has yet to evince that Defendant's life would be placed in imminent risk of bodily harm or death if the permanent conservatorship hearing were not continued. The only reasoning the Public Conservator gave was to place Defendant on a "trial" of being outpatient and then setting the permanent conservatorship hearing to determine whether after the trial period, Defendant was gravely disabled. Defendant states that although the LPS Act imposes a conservatorship when needed as a tool to aid the state in treating a conservatee and protecting the public, it must also actively safeguard the patient’s right to be free from unnecessary restraint and unnecessary treatment. If there were extraordinary circumstances Defendant alleges that the best recourse would be to follow the directive of the Welfare and Institutions code and convene the permanent conservatorship hearing and let the facts present themselves. C. TOLLING THE STATUTE DEPRIVES DEFENDANT OF HIS LEGAL SAFEGUARDS AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE LPS ACT Because the private interests implicated in an LPS conservatorship are significant, the Legislature has incorporated “several layers of important protections” into the commitment system. (Conservatorship of Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 856, 150 P.3d 738) The LPS scheme safeguards patient’s rights via a series of temporary successive detentions for evaluation and treatment. For each new hold, the patient is conferred the right to a certification review hearing and a writ of habeas corpus. The holds lengthen each time, eventually cumulating in the creation of the one year LPS Conservatorship. The temporary conservatorship is designated to provide a temporary period of investigation for the Public Guardian to conduct its investigation into suitability of LPS Conservatorship and appropriate placement for the LPS conservatee (Welf. & Inst. Code § 5354). It is the legislative intent for a temporary conservatorship period to create a 30 day window of time between the 14 day certification for dangerousness to others and self and creation of the one year LPS Conservatorship. Defendant notes that most temporary conservatorships are created ex parte and that during this time LPS conservatees are not granted many procedural safeguards except the right to a writ of habeas corpus. This lack of rigorous legal safeguards is presumably so because within 30 days, the hearing for permanent LPS Conservatorship will transpire or a jury trial date will be set and a trial by jury will commence within a month. However, Defendant distinguishes himself from most LPS defendants in that he has continuously had his permanent LPS Conservatorship hearing date moved and requests for jury trials denied or deferred. Therefore, the safeguards that come with a permanent conservatorship hearing are effectively foreclosed to Defendant as he finds himself currently locked into a loop of continuances. As much as the private interests at stake are weighty and deserving of protection, the stated purpose of the LPS Act forecloses any argument that an LPS commitment is equivalent to criminal punishment in its design or purpose. Because of their differing objectives, “the analogy between criminal proceedings and proceedings under the LPS Act is imperfect at best and ... not all of the safeguards required in the former are appropriate to the latter.” Conservatorship of John L., 48 Cal. 4th 131, 151, 225 P.3d 554, 565 (2010). Defendant differentiates himself from the John L case, as this case addressed rights such as right to confront witnesses and the right against self incrimination. Defendant avers that the right to have hearings on time is a right enjoyed by both criminal defendants and LPS conservatees as both face commitment and a loss of their civil liberties. Given these special circumstances, Defendant cites our California Supreme Court which has indicated its disapproval of “any [legal] procedure that denies or limits any relevant party access to the proceedings and the opportunity to be heard” except “in cases of imminent danger to the life or health of the patient or a similar exigency”. (See Thor v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 725, 733). Through unnecessary tolling the hearing deadline, Defendant avers he has been subject to unnecessary exclusion from meaningful participation in this determination of whether to deprive him of his right to dictate psychiatric medication and placement options, a direct abnegation of the basic tenets of the CA judicial system and affront to the principles of individual integrity that sustain it. (Ibid). Defendant anticipates that the Public Conservator will state he has a right to writ of habeas corpus and therefore his right to judicial review is not entirely barred. Defendant disagrees and states that writ review is an extraordinary remedy. Courts generally do not grant writ relief absent extraordinary circumstances. (City of Half Moon Bay v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 795, 803, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 213.) Pertinent factors that a court must consider in a writ of habeas corpus hearing include whether (1) “the party seeking the writ lacks an adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain relief,” (2) “the petitioner will suffer harm or prejudice which cannot be corrected on appeal,” or (3) “the petition presents an issue of first impression that is of general interest to the bench and bar.” (Dep't of Corr. & Rehab. v. Superior Ct., 94 Cal. App. 5th 1025, 1037, 312 Cal. Rptr. 3d 755, 763 (2023), review denied (Nov. 15, 2023). Defendant notes that most conservatorship fact patterns do not qualify for writ relief and that rehearings are the better avenue for LPS conservatorship challenges. Moreover, Defendant points out that patients are only granted one writ per hold. For temporary conservatorships normally they are granted one writ with the expectation that they will soon have a full hearing on the merits within a month. However, when the permanent conservatorship hearing keeps on being continued, Defendant alleges that his right to periodic writ review is nullified and deprivations to his rights can accrue with no foreseeable avenue of relief. D. LPS CONSERVATORSHIPS MUST BE TERMINATED IF A DEFENDANT NO LONGER MEETS CRITERIA FOR GRAVE DISABILITY AND TOLLING THE STATUTE TO PREVENT FUTURE RELAPSE IS AN ABUSE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING AND DIRECT VIOLATION OF LPS LAW Defendant states that Welfare and Institutions Code mandates that if the goals of that treatment plan are met and the person is no longer gravely disabled, the “conservatorship shall be terminated by the court”, not that the LPS Conservatorship continue to ensure that the goals of the treatment plan continue to be met. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5352.6.) Defendant’s final contention is that even if the statute did theoretically intend for continuances beyond the narrow time limits, the reasons undergirding the continuances are a direct violation of the Welfare and Institutions Code and the intent allowing for equitable tolling. Defendant alleges that his treatment team wished to continue the temporary conservatorship as they were concerned about future relapse into grave disability. Defendant states that in determining grave disability, the only metric allowed in establishment of an LPS conservatorship, the court must consider present grave disability not future likelihood of grave disability. Conservatorship of Murphy (1982) 134 CA3d 15. The threshold and most important question in a case such as this is not whether the proposed conservatee would benefit from conservatorship, but whether, as a practical matter, his basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter cannot be met except by imposing some limitation on that person's liberty. (Conservatorship of Jesse G., 248 Cal. App. 4th 453, 466, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 667, 677 (2016). Defendant points out that the hospital records indicate that in the last ___ months he has been consistent in taking his medication. Any disruptions to his medication have been due to technical errors such as the REMS system being down, or dangerous side effects where the benefits did not outweigh the consequences to his health. He has the support of his mother who the Public Conservator approved as a reliable third party for housing and health assistance. This fact evinces that his condition is not "beyond an ordinary person's ability to deal with" because the person was able to provide the proposed conservatee with food, clothing, and shelter on a regular basis. (see Jesse G. (2016) 248 CA4th 453) (supra). Moreover, he highlights the case of Guerrero where the court decided that other factors such as insight into illness, need for medication, willingness to take said medication without strict oversight, and ability to care for oneself without consistent medication in the system must be considered in this determination of grave disability. Conservatorship of Guerrero (1999) 69 CA4th 442. Defendant asserts that he meets all of these criteria and that witness testimony along with reliable hospital records will indicate that in the last few months he has been stable and not met criteria for current grave disability. Therefore, he concludes that he is not currently gravely disabled within the meaning of the LPS Act. Because the goal of the LPS Act is to rehabilitate the conservatee so that they are no longer gravely disabled, the Public Conservator must petition the court to terminate the conservatorship presently; not in six months when he is in their perspective completely stable. Tolling the temporary conservatorship statutory deadline is an abuse of the court's power and a flagrant disregard for the Welfare and Institutions Code. RELIEF REQUESTED Petitioner moves this court for summary dismissal of the temporary conservatorship and all of its attendant restrictions on Petitioner's rights.
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Most people are familiar with the powers to place a conservatee in a closed locked treatment facility and order the conservatee take psychiatric medication. However, an LPS conservator of the person has the power of placement of the conservatee as well as the same general powers granted a Probate conservator.
To be county specific our letters of LPS conservatorship state that the conservator has the right to consent to routine medical treatment related and unrelated to remedying the conservatee's grave disability. The investigating officer submits its recommendations as to what powers should be granted to the conservator and the court issues orders and letters once it receives all the evidence from both parties. Welf & I C § 5357, 5360. continued...... |
Details
Juvenile Dependency and
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